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Editor's Notes

In this number problems for planners in Bangladesh and Nigeria, agricultural extension in Thailand and Botswana, are two subjects of study together with a major civil service problem in India.

Dr Choguill's plea is that planners and policy-makers should not waste time contemplating the relatively few success stories in developing countries, but should spend much more time analyzing what went wrong and what should have been done in the many projects that failed. In Bangladesh he found three particular constraints: 'organizational bias' where there is a weak institutional framework; 'resource bias' when funds are inadequate for planning projects, 'distance bias' (a) where physical distances are involved and central Vs decentralized confrontation arises, (b) 'cultural' where development is inhibited by some out-of-date procedure eg an old legal system.

Dr Adeneyi puts in a plea for the formation of a cadre of professionally competent planners – specializing in social sciences, experts in project preparation and appraisal. He would like to see a high level National Economic Plan Commission to carry out the decisions of a National Economic Council on which the most senior of Nigeria's Administrators would serve. Theirs would be, he says, the responsibility for preparing the guidelines for National and State Development plans, for recommending fiscal policies, appraising proposals, and preparing related studies.

Dr Haragopal looks at the two administrative 'sub-cultures' in India: the regulatory departments and the development departments. He sees them as all too often in conflict and he regards the regulatory officials as responsible for negating or at least neutralizing the efforts of development personnel.

Alan Kingshotte sees what he calls 'management by objectives' as the way to provide unity of managerial action in achieving organizational goals.

Finally Thomas Morgan in the second part of his article on Thailand, sees a great need for improvement in inter-agency co-operation and he suggests that better performance could be obtained by offering the carrot of more financial resources to those who do well.

Contributors to the Journal will learn with regret of the retirement in March of Miss Gloria Luke who, for the past decade, has dealt most efficiently with many varying chores falling to her desk while assisting the editor in the production of this Journal.

Towards a Theory of Implementation in Planning based on the Bangladesh Experience

CHARLES L CHOGUILL*

A common tautology that permeates the field of planning is that implementation is one of the most crucial aspects of any planning exercise. Plans which do not result in tangible change represent little more than a waste of planning resources. Within the development context, where resources of all types are generally scarce, successful implementation can represent the most critical of all issues in the process of planning growth and development.

A growing body of literature already exists on the implementation processes. As Majone and Wildavsky note, 'ten – perhaps hundreds – of studies are underway at this very moment.'[1] Within the Third World context, the International School of the Town and Country Planning Summer School has devoted two consecutive annual sessions to the topic.[2] Although the proceedings of these meetings provide a relatively rich set of rather glowing case studies of migration policies, new towns and site and service schemes, the number of generalizations that can be drawn from the material is relatively limited.

Similar concern about the implementation process has been shown by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Although primarily concerned with developed nations, OECD material from seminar and symposia from 1972 to 1979 does include a limited amount of information on its own lesser developed Southern fringe member nations. Unfortunately, again, the information available from this source is limited as it seems to concentrate on government's view of government's work.

The objective of the present paper is to suggest a very general type of theoretical framework for the planning/implementation process and then to evaluate its usefulness from the experience of Bangladesh. In one sense, using the Bangladesh experience in this context is rather unfair. The history of physical planning in Bangladesh provides a fairly gloomy picture. Yet it is necessary to remember that the practice of urban planning in that nation is

*Dr Choguill is a lecturer in the Town and Regional Planning Department at the University of Sheffield.

[1] Majone, G and Wildavsky, A, 1978. 'Implementation as Evolution', in Freeman, H E (Ed.), *Policy Studies Annual Review*, No. 2, Beverly Hills: Sage, p. 103.

[2] Town and Country Planning Summer School, 1977 and 1978. *Report of Proceedings*, Overseas School, University of Lancaster and *Report of Proceedings*, International School, University of St Andrews.

of recent origin. It has only been within the past few years, since Independence, that the necessary institutions have been developed for the task. Even today, there are no more than a few dozen planners in all of Bangladesh. Although it is impossible to say with complete certainty that the errors of the past will be avoided in the future, judging from the enthusiasm and dedication of physical planners in Bangladesh today, the chances of success are far higher now than they were a decade ago.

Additionally, it is acknowledged that from such a narrow geographical base, only tentative conclusions can be drawn. Yet even with wider coverage – and such examples can be found everywhere – an inherent problem of such an approach is that for the most part the relatively large number of case studies that have been published deal only with the successes and tend to minimize the difficulties encountered and totally ignore failures in the implementation process.

One contention of the present study is that all too frequently we have posed the wrong questions in attempting to analyze the implementation process. A significant problem that needs to be examined in the process is how to define a failure and to identify the steps that led to it. If this can be successfully accomplished, bearing in mind that in planning defining 'failures' is more difficult than it first appears to be, then perhaps certain common features can be identified which, if avoided, can lead to an improvement in the implementation process.

A Theoretical Framework for Implementation

A 'failure' is obviously something that does not succeed. Yet in planning, such a straightforward definition is somewhat harder to isolate. Buildings that may not be totally appropriate for some intended use may be transferred successfully to alternative uses. Transport projects, such as new roads, are notoriously difficult to identify as a failure due to the long life expected of them and to the perpetually increasing demand for their use. Yet in each of these two examples, assuming the word 'failure' can be appropriately used, some of the blame obviously falls upon those who planned the project and not necessarily on those who implemented it. Our interest here is more directly concerned with the implementation process itself in isolation rather than compounding difficulties by including planning errors.

Even this simplification leaves us with a complex evaluation situation because the seriousness of a failure varies with the type of project under consideration. Again, some hypothetical examples: a bridge over a deep canyon that can be no more than 90 per cent completed is an obvious failure yet a housing programme which provides no more than 90 per cent of the expected units may not necessarily be considered a failure at all. A rail line between two major cities, linking intermediate stations, is not necessarily a failure if only 90 per cent of its length can be constructed.

Basically then, one must recognize that failure and success are not dichotomous but indeed end-points on a continuum. Even some of the examples given later in this paper fall into this 'in-between' ground. The implementation of a planning project *tends* towards failure if it:

i fails to achieve the realistic objectives of the planners because of the way it was carried out;

ii leads to unexpected costs above and beyond an original reasonable allocation of resources (such as unexpected losses to national income, unexpected resource use or unexpected maintenance costs).

Even with these criteria, value-laden words creep in, such as 'realistic objectives' and 'reasonable allocation of resources'. If the cost does not exceed the expected expenditure of the proposed project during implementation it may still tend to be a failure in planning terms if the funds could have been better applied in alternative uses. In such cases as these, the implementation process itself could be a total success. Or alternatively, even an unsound plan could be implemented in a satisfactory manner, a situation that could readily result in a failure.

It is complications such as these that make planning such an exciting area for the analysis of effectiveness. The case studies considered here are concerned with less-than-satisfactory execution of the implementation process itself although even then at times the distinction between planning and implementation becomes slightly blurred. Our concern is directed at determining what such projects have in common and more usefully, whether such results could have been predicted before the implementation process began.

The analysis is facilitated if one sketches out the planning/implementation process as has been done in Figure 1. The 'planning process' puts together plans and policies which are designed to result in an 'environment'. Simplistically, one could say that the planneers have 'positive powers' – the creation of projects that shape and add to an emerging environment – and 'negative powers' – those which control the redevelopment and renewal aspects of an existing environment. In the chain of this complex planning process,



Figure 1 Conceptual Model of the Planning Process

the distinction between the two types of power can justifiably become blurred but for our purposes, despite the generalizations involved, an attempt is made to keep them separate.

In executing positive powers, that is, the implementation of 'projects' (shown in Figure 1 by the inclusion of only a single project), a number of 'contributors' are included who feed various kinds of inputs such as materials, skills and finance into the project. By assuming that the time sequence in the diagram flows from left to right, one can visualize that the planning process results in a project that is carried out by a number of different contributors working to a relatively fixed schedule.

As there are a number of contributors to each major project, it is apparent that some kind of co-ordinating agency is required. In all but those countries least prepared for planning and implementation, the 'co-ordination of implementation' process and the 'planning process' are fused, with interactive links between them. Hopefully the day when planners planned and engineers implemented is a thing of the past although for those familiar with planning in a number of Third World nations, such a hope is probably without foundation.

'Negative powers' are equally important to the planners, including such vital elements as the control of planned development, development control, enforcement of statutory plans, etc. One could justifiably argue that negative powers are more integrally a part of the planning process than of a separate implementation process. Yet such powers are very much a part of implementation itself for without them, much of the potential gain from planning activity would be lost.

Finally, to complete this admittedly over-simplified model, one must incorporate a 'monitoring and feedback' loop which serves to provide information to the planning process on progress in both the positive and negative spheres and an 'experience' feedback mechanism that assists in the formulation and execution of future planning activities as time passes.

On the basis of the process described in Figure 1, one can begin to anticipate where the process could eventually go wrong, resulting in a failure in implementation. Specifically, three constraints can exist upon the process and lead to biased results of an unexpected and undesirable nature.

The first of these, and one which particularly affects the negative planning powers, might be called an 'organizational bias'. This would be characterized by an inadequately co-ordinated or possibly a poorly structured institutional framework. Such bias can arise from numerous sources. Among Commonwealth nations, a tendency exists to adapt legislation based upon the legal framework developed in the United Kingdom whether the objectives of such legislation is appropriate or not to the development situation. In certain cases, these are added to existing law which under indigenous conditions may be more appropriate than the import.[3] In such cases, adaptation of the British system of local administration may be adequate for dealing with day-to-day administration and perhaps even with some

[3] See, for example, Willcox, D L 1978. 'New Planning Wine in Old Legal Bottles: The Case for Greater Utilization of Existing Legal Resources in Malaysia', *Urban Law and Policy*, 1.

maintenance problems but it copes poorly with the key problems associated with development, expansion of infrastructural facilities and the implementation of essential planning schemes.[4]

A similar type of institutional problem arises when either the planning or implementation process is undertaken by organizationally distinct agencies, each with their own goals and objectives. Projects may be seen in different light by each participating organization which can result in conflict among differing objectives leading to sub-optimal implementation of the project under consideration.

The second major reason for failure in implementation, and one which like the first, has political overtones, might be termed 'resource bias'. This source of bias forms a primary threat to positive planning powers but is frequently found to have some effect upon the negative as well. In the consideration of developing nations, a common characteristic is a severe constraint upon the monetary resources available for allocation to planning projects. Lack of such monetary resources is obviously one prime definition of underdevelopment. Yet as viewed here, resource bias goes considerably further. Trained planners and engineers may be in short supply leading to a situation where practitioners are necessarily forced to make decisions within fields where they have little knowledge. The results of such decisions, notwithstanding the dedication of the personnel involved, can result in projects that could be better had the properly trained and experienced manpower resources been available.

A similar situation exists with respect to land resources. Where the demand from the population for food exceeds supply, an obvious policy instrument that could be applied is to preserve by some means agriculturally productive land. The implication to the urban planner is to build at high densities which in turn affects the built form. As a result, architects who may recognize within their country a traditional inheritance of single-storey houses may receive terms of reference from political decision-makers to build multi-storey flats. The imposition of such alien structures upon traditional society can have a devastating psychological and sociological effect which results directly from the resource shortage of land.

A third factor which can be identified as a severe constraint upon the implementation process can be called 'distance bias'. The effect of distance can take one of two rather distinct forms. In the first place, there is physical distance which can be measured in miles or kilometres. If the physical distance separating the 'planning process' and perhaps even the 'co-ordinators of the implementation' from the contributors to the project, or the people who are to be the recipients of the project, is great, the monitoring process which is desirably associated with the project may be severely constrained. This takes us very close to the traditional problem of centralization versus decentralization in planning and is obviously closely related to the organizational bias already considered. A highly centralized

[4] This is more fully explored in Choguill, C L, 1978. 'Organization for Implementation: Seminar Report', Town and Country Planning Summer School, *Report of Proceedings*, International School, St Andrews University.

planning process in the capital city which attempts to control projects in the provinces seems an obvious recipe for serious problems.[5]

A similar situation arises if the contributors to projects attempt to participate from a distance. An international organization located, say, in New York, Washington, Geneva or Nairobi, even if it is merely the provider of finance, may encounter difficulties in communication with project staff in rural areas of, say, India.

A second interpretation of distance, 'cultural distance', can have even more serious implications for the implementation procedure. Foreign consultants, whether based with commercial firms, international organizations or bilateral aid-giving institutions frequently find themselves not really grasping the inherent problems of the host country. Even within the country itself, civil servants from educated, upper- and middle-income backgrounds, may have tremendous difficulty in grasping the true problems of squatters in urban areas under their jurisdiction. The cultural gap between the societies even within a single country is virtually too wide to bridge.

It should be apparent at this stage that the introduction of case studies into this analysis may well result in situations that are something less than crystally-clear cut. Many projects which have failed in development situations have not done so due to a single reason but from a combination of such factors. The obvious example is where a nation's planning system is struggling under an inherently archaic legal system and in such a case, if any other single factor enters the equation, the allocation of a single cause for failure is obviously impossible.

We will now leave the theoretical framework and examine some problems that have arisen in the planning experience in Dacca where certain results have been less satisfactory than one might have wished.

The Effects of Organizational Bias

Organizational bias is associated with the institutional framework that exists within a country. The organizational structure for planning in Dacca is complex by any criteria. There are at least 32 official organizations that have control over at least a part of the planning machinery. These range from the mainline bodies such as the Dacca Improvement Trust and the Bangladesh Urban Development Directorate who have fairly broad powers to more limited organizations, such as the Inland Water Transport Authority which is responsible for the expansion and maintenance of water transport.

In contrast to the decentralized nature of the urban planning organizational structure, that for economic planning within the Government of Bangladesh is highly centralized. The President of the Republic presides over the National Economic Council which in turn considers requests for financial allocations from the various ministries. The Planning Commission separates the ministries from the National Economic Council. The Planning Commission itself is divided into cells, one for each ministry and makes recommendations

[5] Rosser, C, 1977. 'The Planning of Implementation: The Opening to the Provinces', in Town and Country Planning Summer School, *Report of Proceedings*, Overseas School, Lancaster University.

to the National Economic Council. As a result of this complex structure, there is an unavoidable tendency toward following a sectoral approach and ministries are pitted against one another in their quests for funds and project approvals. Once approval is obtained, the project activities and implementation are jealously guarded by each ministry. The inevitable result is a lack of co-ordination between ministries involved in inter-related projects.

Even at the local level, such as in the Dacca Metropolitan Area, the sectoral approach of the central government has profound implications. Unfortunately this division even extends into the various departments within a single ministry.

For example, the most important national urban planning body is the Urban Development Directorate (UDD). Organizationally, the Directorate is a part of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development. Its responsibilities include giving advice in matters relating to urbanization, land use and land development, as well as the preparation of regional, master and site plans.

Despite an acute lack of qualified planners, the UDD has approached its tasks with vigour. Master plans have been prepared for a number of district centres. A National Physical Planning Project has been started (with United Nations Development Programme assistance) to provide linkages between physical and economic planning and to build up the training facilities for planners at the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (with University of Sheffield assistance). The UDD is also involved in the early stages of regional planning, including the preparation of a regional plan for the Dacca Metropolitan Region.

Despite some successes, there are serious problems. In the absence of legislation, the UDD has no powers of implementation. Further, despite the expertise that it is building up, the UDD can take no initiative in Dacca unless invited to do so by the other main urban development agency, the Dacca Improvement Trust.

The Dacca Improvement Trust (DIT) was established in 1956 within the legislative framework of the East Bengal Building Construction Act of 1952 and the Town Improvement Act of 1953. Whereas the 1952 Act is meant to control developments by private individuals, the 1953 legislation provides for planned development efforts. The former established the position of an 'authorized officer' while the latter gave this role to the DIT. As a result of the two acts, in matters of building control, the authorized officer and his staff examine planning applications. The DIT is empowered to prepare master plans and in all matters concerned with improvement, rehousing and road construction schemes, the master plan is followed.

Organizationally, the DIT comes under the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development. This means that it is financially dependent upon the National Economic Council and the Planning Commission in order to implement its projects. For almost all of these, loans are made to DIT from the Central Government and interest must be paid on these monies. Furthermore, DIT is prohibited from cross-subsidization of projects, a

constraint that has serious implications in development activities aimed at the less fortunate members of society.

The accomplishments of the DIT include a Master Plan, prepared in 1959 and never updated,[6] a number of road improvement schemes, some parks, the development of certain industrial estates, housing projects (usually for the more wealthy members of society) and the establishment of a number of markets throughout the Dacca area.

The local authority is the Dacca Municipal Corporation which is an elective body, with a mayor as head of the Corporation. The current law governing the Corporation is the Pourashava Ordinance of 1977 which allows the Corporation to function in a number of areas, including water supply and sewerage, town planning, building control and development planning. The Corporation itself has not taken up all of these functions. The major area of activity has been in the repair and maintenance of roads, with some efforts in market development and education.

As in the case of DIT, the Corporation needs approval from the National Economic Council and the Planning Commission to initiate major projects. As the local authority is administratively a part of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives, problems associated with the sectoral approach remain. Almost all allocations are on a loan basis upon which interest is charged.

THE SYSTEM IN OPERATION

From this brief survey of the organizational framework one can get a fairly accurate idea of the way the system operates in practice. The organization most likely to be capable of making an impact on the problems of Dacca, the Urban Development Directorate, is excluded from working there. Even if permission were granted, the powers of implementation would have to be added to its mandate.

The Dacca Municipal Corporation, although holding powers for road construction, the examination of building applications and participation in town planning, has no planners on its staff. The Dacca Improvement Trust, which currently has two planners, examines planning applications but restricts its planning staff to the task of preparing local improvement projects under the terms of a very outdated master plan.

A significant amount of the organizational bias that occurs in Dacca is due to the existence of conflicting and ambiguous legislation. Most commonly it is due to the enactment of different statutes at different times without adequate attention being paid to the need for coherence among them.[7] A classic example might be the difficulties that arise as a result of the East Bengal Building Construction Act of 1952 and the Town Improvement Act of 1953 with respect to applications to build or alter land use. The Government appointed authorized officer is responsible for allowing permission for the construction of building

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[6] Minoprio, Spenceley and Macfarlane, P W, 1959. *Master Plan for Dacca*, London.

[7] Nuruzzaman, Q M, 1979. 'Physical Planning Legislation in Bangladesh', Unpublished Masters Thesis in Urban and Regional Planning, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology/University of Sheffield, p. 37.

under the Construction Act but the Dacca Improvement Trust is responsible for operating planning permissions under the Town Improvement Act. Although the authorized officer is appointed from among the staff of the Improvement Trust, he is, for this purpose, not responsible to it, but to the Government. Consequently appeals from his decisions go to the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development. But appeals from a refusal of a request for planning permission are decided by the Board of Trustees of the Improvement Trust. The result of this complexity is general disregard of the entire procedure. Between 1961 and 1974, no more than 4,000 building applications were submitted although the population of Dacca increased by over one million.

Constraints on Resources

Although obvious organizational problems exist within the system, the shortage of resources is even more severe. This shortage applies to resources of a widely varying nature. As noted previously, with respect to the trained manpower to carry out physical planning within the country, only a handful of trained planners exist.

A similar shortage exists with respect to land. Given a large and rapidly increasing population (estimated at 80 million with a 3 per cent growth rate) and a finite supply of cultivatable land (22.5 million out of a total 34.5 million acres), the man-to-land ratio is becoming increasingly critical. At the beginning of this century, the population to land ratio as 1.3 persons per acre of cultivated land. Today there are four persons per acre and it is estimated that by the end of this century, there will be eight persons per acre.[8] Even at present, it is estimated that nearly 38 per cent of rural families are landless.[9] Given this super-saturated state of the rural land, a massive increase in the future levels of rural-to-urban migration appears inevitable. In 1974, less than 9 per cent of the Bangladesh population lived in urban areas defined as having at least 5,000 residents.[10] There is every indication then that the demand for residential land in Dacca will increase markedly in the coming years.

Based on past experience, the provision of such land for this purpose has been less than successful. This situation reflects the critical inter-play between two scarce resources: land and money.

The financial powers of the development agencies are inadequate to meet their needs. They are dependent upon loans and grants from the Government. The Dacca Improvement Trust and the Dacca Corporation repay these loans with interest. The concentration of effort of the DIT, as a result, is very much directed to earning as against non-earning schemes. Between 1965 and 1975, the DIT spent Taka 59.6 million (about £2 million, assuming Taka 30=£1.00) on non-earning schemes such as road construction and improvements and parks but Taka 241.4 million on earning schemes, such as industrial estate and commercial development and the development of middle and upper income

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[8] Faaland, J and Parkinson, J R, 1976. *Bangladesh: Test Case for Development*, Dacca: University Press, pp. 124-5.

[9] Abdullah, A, *et al*, 1974. *Swedish International Development Agency/International Labour Office Report on Integrated Rural Development Programme*, Dacca, Appendix A.

[10] Census Commission, 1975. *Bangladesh Census of Population – 1974*, Bulletin 2.

residential areas. Local taxation seems to offer no remedy as, for example, Dacca Municipal Corporation manages to collect no more than 39 per cent of its tax demands.[11]

An excellent example of the impact of financial constraints upon the DIT is found in the development of Tejgaon Industrial Area, which is located in the mid-eastern part of the city. The industrial estate was originally formulated in 1950 by the East Bengal Communication and Building Department, which at that time was responsible for co-ordinating and carrying out building in the public sector. Due to severe financial constraints and lack of interest by the Central Government in Karachi, the project floundered until the establishment of DIT and the Master Plan of 1959. The Master Plan included the development of the industrial area on ground above flood level. A recommendation was also made for a local detailed plan to provide housing areas for industrial workers adjacent to the site. The DIT, constrained by its own financial situation, bought the residential land and sold it to developers (at cost) for the construction of upper income class housing at Gulsham and Banani. The effect is that aside from those workers who are willing to risk crowding into low-lying land that is subject to flooding, over half the labour force at the industrial estate must travel more than forty minutes to reach their place of work. Such a situation results in loss of production and hence perpetuates the critical resource situation of the Bangladesh economy.[12]

In this particular example, the burden of the resource constraint has a differential effect upon different social/economic groups. The industrial labourers were forced to travel significantly further to their place of work than would otherwise have been necessary. Additionally, however, there appears to be what might be called a sense of official blindness to the situation. The Dacca Improvement Trust is charged with carrying out improvement schemes in areas where existing housing is either unfit for human habitation or poses a health danger to its inhabitants. Yet in a recent analysis by Murtaza it was found that nearly 77 per cent of DIT's expenditure since 1962 has been in the area occupied by these new upper income class housing areas which contain only 3 per cent of the total population of Dacca.[13]

Another example of lost resource opportunity in the Dacca implementation process is concerned with the road transport system. Several agencies in Dacca have the power to plan and construct elements of the road system. Although in theory development is guided by the 1959 Master Plan, one must not forget that in 1959 Dacca had a population of about 500,000 compared to a current population four times that amount. The co-ordination problems in the implementation sphere are apparent. An example of the resource waste that results is found in payments made by various public utility agencies to the Dacca Municipal Corporation for damage to roads in laying water, sewerage, telephone and power

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[11]Rahman, M S, 1979. *Bangladesh Pourashava Statistics*, Dacca: Local Government Institute.

[12]Alam, M K, 1979. 'A Proposal for Integrated Development Planning Organization for the Dacca Metropolitan Area', Unpublished Masters Thesis in Urban and Regional Planning, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology/University of Sheffield, Ch. 2.

[13]Murtaza, M G, 1979. 'Urban Development Expenditure in Dacca City', Unpublished Masters Thesis in Urban and Regional Planning, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology/ University of Sheffield, p. 86.

lines. Invariably there are separate agencies for each of these services but it is unfortunate that they feel compelled to cut along and across the roads to perform their respective tasks one after another. In two divisions of the Dacca Municipal Corporation, during a six-month period of 1978, a total of Taka 4.8 million (approximately equal to the annual amount that DIT spends on all parks and roads in all of Dacca) was paid to the Corporation by other agencies for damage caused by the cutting of roads.[14]

A relatively straightforward conclusion would seem to follow. Where resources are scarce, the co-ordination of the implementation process is essential. This, coupled with a constant review and feedback of even the smallest operations, could result in a drastic savings in resources, thus allowing countries such as Bangladesh to accomplish more for the same financial outlay.

Distance Bias and Implementation

Distance, both physical and cultural, can impede the functional flow of information and direction between planners and implementers, between the co-ordinators of implementation and the participants in the implementation process and between the implementation participants and the project with which they are concerned. One of the basic justifications for community self-help and public participation programmes which have become popular among contemporary planners is the desire to shorten the distance between planners and those for whom and with whom they plan.

An excellent example of the distance problem can be found in certain approaches that have been made by Bangladesh to provide site and service schemes for the 150,000 bustuharas that were forcibly removed from their squatter areas by the Government in January, 1975.

The original plan was to establish site and service schemes at three locations on the outskirts of Dacca as soon as possible. At each area, provision was made for about 4,000 housing plots, tubewells, health, education, religious and shopping facilities as well as limited employment opportunities. Despite the appeal of these 'new communities', as they were located as much as fifteen miles from central Dacca they have caused severe economic disruption of the existing employment patterns as most of the residents earned their livelihood in Dacca as day labourers, rickshaw pullers, peddlers and servants.[15]

Whereas the creation of the settlements at two of these sites went more or less according to plan, the camp at Mirpur has encountered severe problems. The construction at Mirpur was to be a joint project between the Government of Bangladesh and the United Nations Capital Development Fund. The total cost of the project, about U.S.$1.5 million (excluding land which was to be provided by Bangladesh), was to be split between the two organizations. While the UN was to cover foreign exchange costs for the water supply system, tubewells, PVC pipe, drainage pumps, overhead water pumps, concrete and steel for construction, sanitation and electricity, the Bangladesh contribution was to cover local currency costs.

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[14]Alam, M K, 1979. *Op. cit.* p. 45.

[15]Qadir, S R, 1977. *Bustees of Dacca*, Dacca: Local Government Institute, p. 37.

Unfortunately, the site itself was a difficult one as it was on paddy land subject to flooding from the monsoon. As a result, a flood control dike was designed to surround the entire 80 acre site of the camp. To complicate matters, apparently someone forgot to do soil bearing tests before construction and the dike sank into seven feet of black loam, rupturing completely in six places.

As of March, 1969, the agreement for the contribution from the United Nations Capital Development Fund had not yet been signed although the broken dike was in place. Nor had the final decision been reached, or even considered, on the equipment which had been pledged. More ominously, it was thought that the United Nations might well withdraw altogether from the project as it was not high on its own list of priorities. Certainly with the monsoon rains this summer, the timetable will be put back significantly. The real losers are, of course, the residents of Mirpur Camp who are currently living in make-shift accommodation awaiting the completion, or at least the salvage, of what was promised to be a new way of life for them.

A number of lessons that are relevant to this analysis emerge. The two major actors in this scene were located, both physically and culturally, a significant distance apart. Although the scheme itself may have been too complex from the outset to implement, one cause of the failure seems to be that the Government, under pressure to provide housing resources, linked forces with an organization that was physically remote. The required co-ordination procedures to link the government bodies and the international organization together and hence to overcome the effect of the separating distance was not adequately developed to solve the problem once it did occur. Matters were complicated further by the feelings of uncertainty by one organization concerning the possible intentions of the other.

The future of the project is uncertain. If the United Nations does in fact withdraw, the project will almost certainly be abandoned. In that event, the Government may attempt to salvage what it can and then sell or rent it off to other activities, such as private housing or industry, recouping whatever cost they can. In this event the Mirpur residents become the forgotten people, the victims of distance bias in implementation.

Conclusion

In summary, one should recognize that planning schemes go astray for a number of reasons. In this analysis, no more than three of these that seem to have particular relevance in Bangladesh have been considered. Obviously, these three, but others as well, apply with equal validity in other parts of the world.

Most importantly, however, an emerging conclusion from the analysis is that it is not only important to consider with pride the 'showcases' that we as planners have created, and without doubt many exist, but to spend far more time trying to analyze why things have gone wrong and what we could have done about them before that happened. In order to accomplish this we must greatly sharpen our tools of evaluation which are in a very bad state of repair. But the payoff from such exercises will be great in terms of resources saved and of resources successfully applied for maximum benefit to the populations with whom we are concerned.

National Development Planning and Plan Administration in Nigeria

ENIOLA O ADENIYI*

The essence of planning for development in Nigeria is now fully recognized and the real issue is how to make planning effective both in conception and in implementation. With over three decades of development planning experience in the country, and in full awareness of the need for the continuous planning of her economy, the new Constitution has in its Directive Principles of State Policy on Economic Objectives provided that the State shall 'Control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity'. In this regard, the State shall direct its policy towards ensuring 'the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development.[1] This provision, apart from the widely accepted need for a planned economy in the country, now makes it mandatory for successive Nigerian governments to undertake the planning of the nation's economy.

Planning, however, need not be undertaken for its own sake but should be embarked upon with clearly defined objectives supported with adequate and effective machinery to make it a worthwhile exercise. Development Planning in Nigeria has achieved varying degrees of success and one of the major issues in this field is the need to evolve effective institutional machinery capable of making the plans achieve the objectives for which they are undertaken.

It is therefore the objective of this paper to make a brief appraisal of Nigeria's Development Planning experience against the background of the administrative framework within which the plans have been made and executed. In addition, the prospects and proposals for effective development planning in the 1980s would be discussed. The paper is divided into three sections. Section one traces the history of development planning from the colonial administration to the Third National Development Plan 1975-1980. Section two makes a critical appraisal of the Planning machinery for the conception and implementation of the development plans. Section three discusses the prospects for effective development planning and execution in the 1980s particularly under the presidential system of government and offers proposals for effective planning machinery in the country.

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[1] Nigeria (1978): *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979*, Section 16, pp. 8-9.

Development Planning Experience in Nigeria

In our discussion of development planning experience in Nigeria we focus attention on the four phases into which development planning exercise in the country could be divided. These are:

i 1945-1954: Experiments in centralized national planning;
ii 1955-1961: Regionalized Development Planning;
iii 1962-1969: Attempts to reinstate national planning and co-ordination; and
iv 1970 to date: Unified planning under the Military.

Each of these phases bears strong relationship to the constitutional and political developments in the country.

During the first phase of development planning in Nigeria, the exercise was undertaken mainly by colonial administrative officers. This was a follow-up to the initiative of the British Secretary of State for the Colonies who called upon the Governments of all British dependencies to produce proposals for development under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. From this exercise emerged the Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria.[2]

This was the first attempt to draw up a plan to guide the allocation of resources for the development of the Nigerian economy. The responsibility for drawing up the Plan at the national level was given to a Central Development Board and this Board was assisted by Area Development Committees in each of the three groups of Provinces into which Nigeria was then divided for administrative purposes. In each Province and Division was also set up advisory bodies which assisted the Area Development Committees.

The Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria took effect from the 1st of April 1946 and just a few months after this, the Richards Constitution which became operative on the 1st of January, 1947 was introduced. This set in motion the constitutional development which turned Nigeria into a Federation on 1 October 1954. As a result of this political development and partly due to rising costs the Plan had to be revised in 1951 and a Revised Plan[3] covering the period, 1951-56 was promulgated. The preparation and implementation of both the ten-year Plan and the revised five-year Plan were highly centralized and they both covered the whole country. In this regard, the preparation of the Plans are said to have been 'on the lines of a Military plan of campaign'[4] and even though their preparation was the primary responsibility of the Central Development Board, deliberate efforts were made to ensure not only horizontal consultation and co-ordination (among the Departments of the central government) but also vertical (central-regional-provincial-divisional/district) consultation in formulation and implementation of the development schemes in the Plan.

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[2] Nigeria (1946): *A Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria*. Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1945, laid on the Table of the Legislative Council on 13 December 1945 and approved by the Council on 7 February 1976.

[3] Nigeria (1951): *A Revised Plan of Development and Welfare Nigeria 1951-56*, Sessional Paper No. 6, of 1951.

[4] Adedeji, A (1969) 'Federalism, Economic Planning and Administration' Paper presented at the Conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, NISER, Ibadan, p. 3.

In spite of this, however, neither of the Plans was comprehensive as they were essentially a series of development schemes which bore little or no relationship to one another or to any overall objective. Little or no attempt was also made to co-ordinate governmental programmes and activities with development in the private sector. It could therefore be claimed that the planning of the Nigerian economy during this phase, though national, was far from being comprehensive or integrated.

Even though the Plans were highly centralized and a lot of consultation took place among various levels of governments and departments, the preparation of the Plans was limited to a few colonial officers without any Nigerian participation. The absence of Nigerian participation in the Plans was a major omission in the planning machinery as, however well-meaning a colonial administrator (whose main objective is the maintenance of 'law and order') may be, it is difficult for him to appreciate the aspirations of a colonial people particularly in the absence of an articulate press. As has been observed elsewhere, 'the planning exercise failed to satisfy the fundamental requirement of good planning, i.e. involvement of the people for whom planning is undertaken.[5]

When Nigeria became a Federation on 1 October 1954 and more powers were given to regional governments, development planning became regionalized. Each of the governments of the Federation including the Federal Government took control of parts of the Plan that fell within its constitutional responsibility or its own territory. The Plan was therefore terminated on 31 March 1955 and each of the governments launched new Plans with effect from 1 April 1955. This therefore brought to an end the phase of experiment in centralized and integrated national development planning and the beginning of regionalized development planning.

The second phase of development planning in Nigeria was regionalized development planning which became prominent between 1955 and 1962. With the termination of the Revised Plan, both the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Federal and Regional Governments agreed to make 1 April 1955 the beginning of the new Planning period. The Federal and the then four Regional Governments (including the Southern Cameroons) prepared different development plans with varying objectives, strategies and orientation. The plans prepared by the Federal and Western Region Governments were comprehensive and precise in terms of programmes and projects with the Federal plan showing details of planned expenditure for one year and that of the Western Region giving systematic planned expenditure for the five year period 1955-60.

The Northern Region Government was able to publish 'A Statement of Policy on the Development Programme, 1955-60' which was later revised and titled 'The Extension to the Development Programme, 1955-60, 1 April 1960 to 31 March 1962'. Owing to the financial stringency that faced the Eastern Region at that time, the Government was only able to prepare merely an outline of development plan. However, when her finances

[5] Adeniyi, E O (1978) 'Development Planning in Nigeria' *Nigeria Trade Journal* Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 9

improved in 1958 owing to the production of petroleum in commercial quantities, the government was able to prepare a revised plan to cover the period 1958-62.[6]

As could be expected of five different Plans which had no national focus, and objectives, the plans were prepared with varying degrees of sophistication and comprehensiveness. In many cases, the Plans were no more than a list of projects which were neither co-ordinated nor related to any overall regional or national objectives. Rather than co-operate and plan the economy as a national entity, the regional governments were engaged in fruitless rivalries, duplication of projects and disparate objectives in such a way as to make co-ordinated national planning impossible.

Without clear-cut perspectives and objectives during the preparation of the Plans, it was therefore no surprise that the implementation of the Plans ran into several difficulties. Only the Western Region Government was able to achieve a reasonable measure of success which encouraged her to prepare another Plan to cover the period 1960-65.[7] The other governments encountered a number of problems among which were shortage of executive capacity, particularly in the administrative, professional and technical fields; the introduction of unrelated projects without proper analysis and co-ordination with other projects; and shortage of funds particularly in the Eastern Region.

A close examination of the programmes in the plans of the five governments shows lack of internal consistency, absence of integrated and co-ordinated programmes, inadequate feasibility studies and proper costing as well as disparate and incoherent development objectives. The inability of the Federal Government to provide effective leadership at both the political and administrative levels added to the poor plan performance noticeable at this period of development planning in the country. Even when at a later stage of the Plan period when the need to co-ordinate the implementation of the programmes in the various plans became obvious, the inter-governmental institutions set up under the leadership of the Federal Government were half-heartedly supported in such a way as to incapacitate and render them ineffective. The inability of the Federal Government to provide effective leadership through intergovernmental machinery was a major drawback to effective development planning at this period.

The Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development[8] which was submitted in 1954 following its mission to Nigeria in 1953 came rather too late to influence planning machinery at this period. Its task was to 'appraise the economic development prospects of Nigeria and to recommend practical measures for their realization'. It undertook this task before Nigeria became a federation with semi-autonomous regional units and its report was therefore based on the assumption that the central government would provide effective leadership in the preparation and implementation of co-ordinated

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[6] Eastern Region of Nigeria, *Revised Development Programme* 1958-62: Official Document No. 13 of 1960.

[7] Western Region of Nigeria, *Western Region Development Plan 1960-65*: Sessional Paper No. 17 of 1959.

[8] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Nigeria*, Federal Government Printer, Lagos (1954) and Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, (1955).

plans geared towards full integration and development of the national economy. The Bank's report was submitted only twenty days before Nigeria became a federation so that the recommendations contained in the report did not effectively influence the preparation and implementation of co-ordinated and coherent national development plan.

One aspect of the Bank's recommendations which influenced the latter part of this second phase of development planning in Nigeria was the setting up , in 1955, of the National Economic Council (NEC) which provided 'a forum in which the Federation and the Regions might meet to discuss the many economic problems common to each other, notwithstanding their separate constitutional spheres'. The Council which was under the chairmanship of the Governor-General and later the Prime Minister consisted of representatives of the Central Council of Ministers and the Regional Executive Councils. As responsibility for economic planning under Nigeria's Constitution was a concurrent subject, the NEC provided merely a framework of inter-governmental dialogue without encroaching on the constitutional responsibility of member governments. At the same time, however, the Council was to provide machinery for the formulation and implementation of national economic policy and ensure close economic co-operation among the governments of the Feederation.

An examination of the records of the actual working of the NEC shows that it was more a talking shop and platform for bargaining where member governments jealously guarded their constitutional rights while at the same time trying to ensure that national development resources and projects are located in their respective areas of jurisdiction. However, in order to bring some objectivity into the work of the NEC and as a result of pressure by a member government for a more vigorous developmental leadership role for the central government, the Council at its seventh meeting in August 1958 set up the Joint Planning Committee (JPC). Naturally, the JCP consisted of experts from the Federal and Regional Ministries of Finance, Trade, Agriculture and the Central Bank. One of the main responsibilities of the JPC was to advise the NEC and prepare a statement of fundamental objectives for the guidance of the planning committee of the governments in the formulation of their development plans for each succeeding period. With the setting up of the JPC a better sense of direction was given to the governments of the Federation in their development planning endeavours.

On the recommendation of the JPC, the National Economic Council at its tenth meeting early in 1959 decided that 'a National Development Plan should be prepared for Nigeria with the objective of the achievement and maintenance of the highest possible rate of increase in the standard of living and the creation of the necessary conditions to this end, including public support and awareness of both the potential that exists and the sacrifices that will be required.'[9]

This decision marked the gradual end of the phase of regionalized development planning and the beginning of attempts to reinstate national planning and co-ordination. It also led to

[9] Federation of Nigeria (1962) *National Development Plan* 1962-68 Federal Ministry of Economic Development, (Lagos) pp. 46-47.

the preparation of the National Development Plan 1962-68 which the designers regarded as the first in a series which will bring Nigeria to the 'take-off' stage with a modernized economy. The Plan was also aimed at giving a sense of direction to the economy, a sense of priorities and urgency and at enlisting the support and co-operation of all sections of the community to work for a better future.

This phase of national development planning was significant for a number of reasons. In the first place, all the governments of the Federation subscribed to the same statement of fundamental objectives in the preparation of their development plans. This is in contrast to the absence of such fundamental objectives in the preceding phases of development planning. In the second place, all the governments agreed to have a uniform plan period, beginning with the 1962-68 Plan, so that overlapping periods of development plans became something of the past. Thirdly, conscious efforts were made to set and quantify the national objectives and ensure a common national planning framework. In the fourth place, all the governments accepted the same priorities. The highest priorities were accorded to agriculture, industry and the training of high and intermediate manpower.

In spite of the acceptance of common objectives and priorities during the preparation of the Plan, what eventually emerged as the *National Development Plan 1962-68* was not essentially different from the 1955-62 Plans. Each of the four governments prepared different programmes which lacked internal consistency and national focus. Many of the projects in the regions overlapped one another and in some cases, the programmes appeared to be competing with one another. During plan implementation, regional interests became more and more dominant as the acceptance of common objectives and nationally co-ordinated planned development effort remained partial and half-spirited.

A major reason for this was that the acceptance of the same statement of fundamental objectives by the NEC was not accompanied by any institutional reforms geared to the preparation and implementation of a nationally orientated and co-ordinated development plan. Thus the administrative machinery for planning and implementation 'remained heavily skewed towards the regions, weakening both local involvement as well as central direction'. In addition, 'the fundamental objectives of policy are themselves neither clear nor adequate' so that they could not easily be communicated to, understood and accepted by all decision units concerned with the planning and implementation of the Development Plan.[10] It was thus difficult to make the 1962-68 Development Plan a nationally co-ordinated plan both in its formulation and implementation.

The outbreak of the national crisis in 1966 and the subsequent creation of new States in 1967 provided the military administration the opportunity to introduce institutional reforms for development planning in Nigeria aimed at unified and co-ordinated planning. In March 1966, the military administration set up the National Economic Planning Advisory Group of ten members appointed on the basis of individual ability and competence, without special reference to regional representation. The Group had the

[10]Aboyade, O (1968) 'The Relations between Central and Local Institutions in the Development Process'. *Nigerian Opinion* Vol. 4, Nos. 2 & 3, February & March; and Nos. 4-6 April – June, p. 297.

responsibility of advising the Federal Government on the planning and co-ordinated development of the national economy. Before the activities of the Group lapsed with the renewed national crisis in July 1966, it was able to review the status of the national economy, analyzed the balance of payments problems, advised on the 1966/67 Capital Estimates and on the Guide-posts for the Second National Development Plan.

The escalation of the national crisis into the civil war between 1967 and 1969 interrupted the implementation of the National Development Plan 1962-68 as a major part of the nation's resources was devoted to prosecuting the Civil War. During this period, Annual Capital Budgets were used for the allocation of resources for development. However, with the creation of twelve new states in 1967 instead of the existing four Regions, the need for new inter-governmental machinery for development planning became clearer. The need to involve more Nigerians in formulating and implementing development plans in the country was appreciated by many government functionaries.

Two main factors are responsible for this development: the growing pre-eminent position of the Federal Government in providing both the political and administrative leadership in development planning; and the enhanced fiscal power of the Federal Government *vis-à-vis* the State Governments which enables the Federal Government to determine priorities for which resources are to be allocated. These two factors provide the basis for the new administrative machinery under which the Second National Development Plan 1970-75[11] and the Third National Development Plan 1975-80[12] was prepared.

The Central Planning Office (CPO) of the Federal Ministry of Economic Development now provides the institutional leadership in development planning. At the Federal level, the CPO holds regular consultations with Ministries on development programmes and projects as well as offer guidelines on development Plans.

At the national level, the CPO regularly convenes meetings of the Joint Planning Board consisting of Senior Planning Officials of the State Ministries of Economic Planning, the Central Bank and Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER). Officials at the meetings are responsible for working out the format and the criteria for the preparation and selection of State and Federal programmes and projects which are to be integrated into the National Development Plans. The meetings do provide opportunities for effective communication and feed-back among Federal and State planning Officers. The progress made in the implementation of the State Plans are also reviewed from time to time thus offering opportunities for appraisal and necessary modifications of the Plans. The CPO encourages state governments to set up planning committees comprising officers responsible for planning in all state ministries in order to ensure harmonious preparation and implementation of State development plans. Some states have also set up Economic Advisory Councils to help in the formulation of their plans and review progress made from time to time.

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[11]Federation of Nigeria (1970) *Second National Development Plan 1970-75* (Lagos).
[12]Federal Republic of Nigeria (1975), *Third National Development Plan 1975-80* (Lagos).

In collaboration with the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), the CPO organizes conferences, Workshops and training programmes for planning officers at both the Federal, State and Local government levels. In connection with the Third National Development Plan 1975-80, the CPO prepared guidelines[13] setting out objectives and criteria to be followed during the preparation of the Plan. It also prepares Progress Reports and review of project performance on the Plans from time to time. Such Reports,[14] in addition to making reviews of progress made in plan execution also identify problems and bottlenecks in plan implementation.

Conferences of Commissioners responsible for Economic Planning in the Federation are also organized by the CPO where objectives of the Development Plans are agreed upon, the Plan documents finalized and thereafter presented to the Supreme Military Council for ratification. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) under the chairmanship of the Head of State provides the powerful national forum for harmonizing at the national level, the major development issues affecting the economy of the country. The development objectives, programmes and projects of the governments are appraised and approved by the Supreme Military Council. In contrast to the operations of National Economic Council in the First Republic, the SMC is national in orientation thus enabling it to bring objectivity and the need for a co-ordinated national planning into its operations and decisions.

In spite of the trends towards unified development planning in Nigeria, a number of institutional arrangements have continued to create problems for effective and co-ordinated national development planning and the next section now makes a review of the planning machinery in the country.

Review of Administrative Machinery for Planning in Nigeria

For any development planning exercise to be meaningful and effective, a necessary prerequisite is the right administrative machinery for its conception and implementation. The first series of development plans in Nigeria prepared under British colonial administration were not geared to planned development of the colonial economy. The colonial administrative machinery was limited in its objectives of the maintenance of law and order and of opening up the colonial economy to serve the needs of the metropolitan government. Hence the Ten Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria and its subsequent revised versions had no clearly defined objectives and underlying philosophy as to what the Plan was to do in building a new economic and social order in the country. Even with the achievement of independence in 1960, no attempt was made to transform the bureaucracy into a development orientated Civil Service without which development planning would be a farce. It is therefore no surprise that without any clearly defined objectives and with little or no attempt to transform the civil service into a development – orientated machinery, many of the schemes proposed in the Plans were no more than an expansion of normal departmental activities of government.

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[13]Federation of Nigeria (1973) *Guidelines for the Third National Development Plan, 1975-80*, Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, (Lagos).

[14]Federal Republic of Nigeria (1974) *Second Progress Report on Second National Development Plan* 1970-79 and (1978) *First Progress Report on Third National Development Plan 1975-80* Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development (Lagos).

Even after independence, the transformation required of the civil service into a development orientated service was not achieved simply by the replacement of expatriates with Nigerians. The civil service was therefore not able to grapple with the essential requirements of development planning. For example, the Federal civil service was not able to provide the much-needed leadership for their regional counterparts in defining the objectives of development and devising administrative framework within which the objectives could be translated into reality. Admittedly, the inability of the Federal Government to provide political leadership as development planning became regionalized considerably affected the capability of the federal civil service in its inability to provide the required leadership. Development planning in Nigeria has therefore suffered from the absence of administrative and political leadership at the Federal level particularly as effective administrative machinery for the conception and implementation of development plans could not be devised for a considerable length of time.

The weakness of the administrative machinery for development planning in Nigeria could be illustrated by the operations of the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) to which reference has been made in the previous section. Although the NEC was a consultative body designed to provide a framework of inter-governmental dialogue without encroaching on the responsibilities of member-governments, yet it was expected to provide maximum encouragement to the development of national economic policy and co-ordinated development planning of the national economy. However, political differences, acrimonious regional rivalries and the 'struggle for regional economic advantage – known in Nigerian journalistic parlance as "sharing the national cake" – provides the key to an understanding of the planning strategy and plan implementation'[15] during the operative years of the NEC. It was therefore unable to provide the administrative and political will required for integrated national development planning.

A detailed critique of the NEC as a planning machinery has been provided by Professor Aboyade in the article referred to above and among reasons for its ineffectiveness are the following:

i it was more or less an advisory and consultative body without any clearly defined and executive responsibilities so that it turned out to be no more than a talking shop and a forum for political and economic bargaining among the regional and federal governments;

ii it met rather infrequently so that there were periods when it did not meet within twelve months;

iii member-governments often attended the Council meetings with pre-conceived stands on matters listed for discussion and this did not make for any objectivity and flexibility particularly when, (as it was often the case) regional premiers do not attend the NEC meeting;

iv even though administrative and professional officers were often part of the delegations to the meetings, they were usually not given opportunities to expatiate on subjects in order to provide some objectivity in the examination and eventual determination of issues before the Council.

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[15] Aboyade, O (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 323.

The setting up of the JPC in 1958 to assist the NEC in its work appeared to infuse some objectivity into its operations. The JPC was able to meet quite frequently and make recommendations to the NEC on co-ordinated planning of the nation's economy. It played a prominent role in the conception and preparation of the First National Development Plan 1962-68. Like the NEC, it however had problems which militated against its effectiveness. In the first place, it has no permanent membership and member-government representation on it depended on subjects listed for discussion. It therefore lacked the advantage of continuity which is essential for effective planning. In the second place, the JPC is not represented at the meetings of the NEC so that its ability to influence deliberations and decisions at the NEC was limited. Thirdly, even though the JPC was supposed to be a committee of experts, most of the officials who took part as members were generalist administrators without specialist training in development planning. In view of the fact that development planning became regionalized and a lot of emphasis was placed on sharing the national cake, it was not uncommon for JPC members to be subjective in the position they took on issues in the same way as members of the NEC thereby impairing objectivity in their deliberations. Furthermore, the JPC regarded the duty of tendering advice to Ministers to be that of public officials alone and in its opinion, this could not be delegated to outsiders. It therefore jealously guarded its privileged position and restricted formal participation by and consultation with non official economists/experts.

There was a lot of unwarranted secrecy that surrounded the preparation and implementation of the Plans. No attempt was made, for instance, to prepare the country for 'the public support and awareness' which the NEC envisaged in respect of the 1962-68 Development Plan. The Nigerian public was not consulted at all stages of the plans and be made to feel a part of the planning and development process. Even many top officials of Ministries were neither aware of, nor familiar with their Ministries' projects. This is borne out by the Second Progress Report on the Second National Development Plan 1970-75 where part of the problems of implementation identified was that 'there is evidence that in some of the executive Ministries, Officials are not quite familiar with the content of their programmes under the Plan' and then emphasized that 'it is the duty of every head of department and all his senior staff to take greater interest in, and be constantly informed of progress in the implementation of his Ministry's plan projects'.[16]

It is therefore clear that a major drawback to the planning machinery in this country is the absence of appropriate ways and means of involving and identifying the people with the development plans and the development process as well as absence of commitment on the part of a good number of officials whose duty it is to execute the plans.

The planning machinery did not also involve Local Governments in the planning exercise in a way to make them part of the national development effort. In this connection the importance of Local Governments as investment decision-making cells and of their activities as development agencies in many parts of the country has been underlined.[17] In spite of their importance however, Local Governments have not been brought into the

[16]Federal Republic of Nigeria (1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

[17]Ayida, A (1969) 'Development Objective' Paper presented at the Conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, NISER, (Ibadan), p. 17.

planning process until very recently when arrangements are being made for the Fourth National Development Plan. One of the effects of this has been that grass-root support for the national development effort has been lacking thereby reducing the effectiveness of the planning machinery.

In concluding our discussion of the planning machinery in the country, we wish to emphasize that a number of the problems which has bedevilled development planning in the country are being resolved during the unified planning phase under the military regime. In spite of this, however, a number of problems such as over-ambitious programmes and projects, shortage of executive capacity, lack of plan discipline, inadequate feasibility studies on projects etc. still constitute major bottlenecks in plan preparation and implementation as well as in the achievement of a fully integrated national development planning machinery.

Prospects and Proposals for Effective Development Planning Machinery

As a follow-up to the examination of the administrative problems of development planning in the country, it is necessary to ask what prospects now exist for the achievement of effective development planning machinery in the country? The relevance of this question is underlined by the fact that even with the new constitution, Nigeria is still a federation with development planning a concurrent subject within the jurisdiction of both the Federal and State Governments. Rather than view this as a potential source of danger to integrated development planning as the case in the first and second phases of development planning in Nigeria, there are reasons to believe that unco-ordinated development planning is a thing of the past in the country.

In the first place, the acceptance of common development objectives by both the Federal and State governments and the machinery for regular consultations between the Federal and State governments already established in the military regime, would, invariably be strengthened.

In a federation as we have in Nigeria, processes which bring about dynamic equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal forces are always at work. Adjustments are continuously being made in the relationship between the Federal and State Governments which are in the direction of further economic integration in the country. Nigeria of the 1980s unlike in the First Republic cannot be said to desire union but purposeful unity in her economic and social relationships.

In the second place, the provision within the new constitution for development planning and the establishment of a National Economic Council would provide the basis for the continuing search for effective development planning machinery in the country. The institutional framework would no doubt provide for purposeful communication between Federal and State Governments in such a way as to enhance nation-wide development planning. In addition the constitutional provision for the setting up of a National Economic Council is likely to generate articulate parliamentary system that has the will to influence and direct development objectives and plan implementation with full knowledge of the implications of development plans in the social and economic progress of the nation.

A third factor which is likely to foster integrated development planning in the country is the increasing fiscal power of the Federal Government which is enhancing her leadership role in all spheres of governmental activities especially in economic planning and development matters. Through the system of determination of priorities and back-up with financial grant and directives, the Federal government would be in a pre-eminent position to influence the course of development planning in the country.

It is to be emphasized however, that the above reasons are predicated on the assumption that the Federal Government would be willing and able to provide the necessary political leadership and will, as well as impetus to carry through dynamic development policies and programmes. In other words, it is assumed that the Federal Government of the 1980s would possess the necessary resources in terms of leadership at both the political, financial and administrative levels. It is also assumed that the National Economic Council would provide the right type of nation-wide institutions and effective means of communications between the Federal, State and Local Governments on the one hand and among the States on the other as well as promote general involvement of the Nigerian populace in the development process.

In order to provide for the administrative machinery for integrated development planning in the country, Chart I illustrates the proposed framework within which such a machinery

PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN NIGERIA

could be made effective. At the apex of the proposed planning machinery is the President of the nation whose ultimate responsibility it is to take decisions on the economic and social development of the country. An executive body known as the National Economic Council (NEC) with membership consisting of the President, the Vice-President, State Governors, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Deputy Chairman of the National Economic Planning Commission should be set up. The NEC should have powers to take decisions concerning the economic affairs of the nation and in particular on measures necessary for the co-ordination of the economic planning efforts or economic programmes of the various governments of the Federation. It should also be required by law to meet at least thrice a year.

Given the present nineteen states structure of the country, the NEC will consist of twenty-three members including the Chairman. It may appear that by making the NEC an executive body, the constitutional powers of the states to embark on their own planning may be limited. This however need not be the case as one of the main objectives of the NEC is co-ordination of development planning – an objective which could effectively be achieved through such an executive body in which all the heads of governments in the Federation are represented. Besides, the provision of effective leadership in economic and other matters by the Federal Government envisaged in this proposed machinery would enable the NEC to perform the co-ordinating and unifying role in development planning.

The responsibility for the formulation of development policies, programmes and plans as well as the execution of plans approved by the NEC should be the responsibility of National Economic Planning Commission (NEPC). This should be a body of experts appointed on the basis of their professional competence and functional responsibilities under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President. An expert in development planning should be appointed its Deputy Chairman and be responsible for its day-to-day administration. In addition to its Chairman and Deputy Chairman, the Commission should consist of five distinguished academicians, five knowledgeable persons to represent interests in agriculture, industry, commerce, trade union and the professions holding office for three to five years. The ex-officio members should consist of the Director of Planning and representatives of the following bodies: the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), the Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, the Central Bank, the Federal Office of Statisitics, the National Science and Technology and Technology Development Agency, the Energy Commission, the Federal Director of Agriculture and the Director of the Manpower Board.

The NEPC should be charged with the responsibility of:

1 preparing statements of fundamental objectives to guide the formulation and preparation of national and state development plans;
2 formulating national development plans and providing guidance to state governments in the preparation of their development plans;
3 recommending to the NEC economic and fiscal policies and other measures required to mobilize financial, material and human resources for implementing development plans;
4 appraising the progress achieved in the execution of development plans and recommending what modifications to be made in the plans and policies from time to time; and

5 preparing Studies, reports and surveys essential for effective development planning and plan execution. The stance of the Commission should be that of a non-partisan group of experts with a long-term vision of the national economic and social development objectives.

In order to ensure full participation by various groups and interests in the national development process, a Consultative Committee on National Economic Development (CCNED) should be set up. On the Committee should be represented a wide range of interests: the educational, agricultural, industrial, commercial, employers' associations, trade unions, professional bodies, transport and communications etc. The Committee would serve as a consultative and advisory group to both the NEC and the NEPC as well as serve as a clearing-house for opinions on economic and social matters of importance to national development.

The National Economic Planning Commission requires a well staffed and equipped secretariat in order to be able to discharge its responsibilities. The existing Central Planning Office of the Federal Ministry of Economic Development should form the nucleus of the NEPC Secretariat proposed in the Chart. The Federal Office of Statistics and a revamped National Manpower Board should constitute integral parts of the Secretariat which should also serve the NEC and the CCNED. With the Vice-President as Chairman of the NEPC and a well staffed and equipped secretariat, the NEPC should have the political backing, the expertise and facilities at its disposal to undertake effective national development planning and execution.

As indicated in the Chart, the Federal Government should have an Inter-Ministerial Co-ordinating Committee and effective Planning Divisions in the various Ministries to prepare and implement approved development programmes at the Federal level. The Federal Statutory Corporations which are subject to directives from appropriate Federal Authorities should also have planning Departments, to ensure that their programmes and projects are consistent with agreed national Objectives.

Each State Government should establish its own State Economic Planning Council (SEPC) under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Governor with similar membership and functions at the State level as the NEPC. Inter-Ministerial Co-ordinating Committees, Planning Divisions in the Ministries and Planning Departments in Statutory Corporations should also be similarly set up in each State of the Federation.

Of particular importance is the proposed Local Government Development Planning Board shown in the Chart. The Board is to focus on development both at the regional and grass-root levels assisted by Local Government Councils and Areas Development Committees. Among its responsibilities would be the promotion of development at the local level through the mobilization of material and human resources as well as self-help within communities in Local Government areas. It should work in such a way as to promote co-operative and integrated development programmes and projects at the local level and ensure that people at the grass-roots level identify themselves with the development process.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the proposed planning machinery at the Federal, State and Local Government and even Parastatal levels, it would be necessary to develop a cadre of professionally competent planners – specialists in the social sciences, experts in project preparation and appraisal, statisticians etc. as well as a development-orientated civil service. There is a general shortage of planning specialists in the country and this calls for intensive training programmes for existing officials at all levels of government and the recruitment and training of new officials to face the challenges of development planning in Nigeria. Universities in the country should assist in this training programme and more particularly, the Administrative staff College of Nigeria and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research should play a prominent role in this regard in their staff development and training programmes.

Conclusion

Nigeria has gone through a number of phases in her development planning programmes in the last three decades and there has emerged the need for well co-ordinated and internally consistent development plans. The formulation and implementation of such plans however, calls for the development of effective institutional framework without which the country may not be able to maximize advantages derivable from such plans. It is against this background that a review of the existing administrative machinery for development planning has been undertaken and proposals for effective development planning machinery made. It has, of course, been assumed in this paper that national integration through development planning would continue to feature prominently in Nigeria of the 1980s and that the Federal Government under the presidential system of government would provide both the political will and the administrative leadership to enhance the development process. The proposals contained in this paper are therefore designed to provide the administrative framework within which Nigeria would be able to achieve nationally co-ordinated and integrated development plans with the objective of enhancing social and economic development in the country.

Regulatory vs. Development Departments; Conflict between Two Administrative Sub-Cultures in Rural Development

G HARAGOPAL*

Rural development has become a major concern of the third world countries in general and of India in particular. In India more than 70 per cent of the people live in 500,000 of its villages. Agriculture, the most important livelihood of rural India, generates approximately 50 per cent of the National Income, accounts for one half of the foreign exchange and deploys about 70 per cent of its labour force in the country.[1] Without rural development the twin objectives of development administration – nation building and socio-economic development[2] – cannot be realized. These tasks assumed greater urgency because of low level living standards of the people. Therefore, the government in independent India has had to assume greater responsibility for the direction of the developmental process. In this enterprise they have had to depend on administrative machinery – one of the key instruments of action.[3] As a result, a thorough analysis of the multiple dimensions of the administrative phenomenon and its often imperceptible processes has become a prerequisite for devising any meaningful and effective development strategy.

India ventured to bring about all-round development through planned effort. It envisaged far reaching changes in the structure and institutions of Society.[4] The active involvement of the people is an inevitable condition for achieving the objectives of any development programme; for development in the ultimate analysis, is the sum total of the combined effort of all the people. Popular efforts such as these depend upon the self-confidence of society, mutual identification of governmental machinery and people, a modern, rational, and scientific outlook etc. This also means that the major bottleneck to development lies, to

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[1] M A Muttalib, *Development Administration in Rural Government for Agricultural Production*, Osmania University Press, 1973, p. XIV.

[2] For details on this item see Milton J Esman's, The Politics of Development Administration, in Montgomery and Siffins (Eds) *Approaches to Politics, Administration and Change*, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, 1966, p. 9.

[3] *Ibid*. p. 78.

[4] Tarlok Singh, *India's Development Experience*, The Macmillan Co. of India Limited, Madras, 1974, p. 4.

a large extent, in the values, attitudes and beliefs of the people.[5] Indian society lacks some of these developmental conditions because of centuries of alien and colonial rule, and social, economic and psychological constraints of a traditional society. There are a number of administrative, social and economic institutions which are so deeply entrenched in the system that there is a vicious circle around attitudes, institutions and social change. These 'attitudes and institutions have to be radically changed in order to promote speedy development'.[6]

The administrative machinery that existed at the time of independence was the regulatory machinery which was responsible for collection of revenue and maintenance of law and order. A number of development departments sprung up in the wake of independence and democratic decentralization to take care of developmental and welfare activities. But they did not integrate the revenue machinery with the development departments. Thus 'the field units of revenue collection have been largely alienated from the main stream of rural life'.[7] One observes that there are two sets of administrative machinery engaged in rural development. With the result, 'dichotomy in revenue and development administration has been the main characteristic feature of democratic decentralization and decision making process in India'.[8]

The chart below[9] explains the present organizational pattern.



[5] One of the serious charges of Myrdal against the economists is their failure to take values of the society into account in the economic analysis. See Gunnar Myrdal, *Challenge of World Poverty*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1970, pp. 3-29.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 17.

[7] M N Kulkarni, Field Organization – A Conceptual Frame Work, *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Oct-Dec, 1975, p. 647.

[8] M N Kulkarni, Some Pre-Conditions of Reform in Administration, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 20 January '68, p. 205.

[9] For a more detailed description on the organizational structure see K Seshadri, *Agricultural Administration in Andhra Pradesh*, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1974, pp. 44-45.

The revenue machinery from village level to the state level was very well-knit. The revenue pyramid, with the District Collector on the top, down to the village officers (Karanam) at the bottom was introduced to maintain control over rural areas. The institution of village officer, which continues to be hereditary in character,[10] provided the vital link between the government and the villagers. The overall machinery served the needs of the metropolitan power with all the loyalty and discipline which rendered colonial rule not only possible but quite strong.

This well built administrative infrastructure was readily available to the new independent regime to help it manage the affairs of Indian society. Thus the administrative machinery devised by the British Raj persisted in spite of the fact that there had been a drastic change in the goals of the new government. Even today no effort has been made to examine the relevance of the machinery and the changes which need to be effected in its working style.[11] This attempt is necessitated because there are very few instances in the literature of public administration where the administrative machinery altered its attitudinal pattern and style of functioning by voluntary action.

The Panchayati Raj institutions, an outcome of the democratic decentralization process, were started with the hope that 'they would help in releasing leadership, building up citizenship awareness and sense of participation for national development in economic, social and political fields, facilitating transition of an archaic folk society from traditionalism to modernity.'[12] But in reality these institutions did not bring about any major changes in the existing administrative structure. On the other hand, it is charged that they are suffering from excessive bureaucratization.[13] The perceptible structural changes that have been introduced were that almost all the development departments were associated with the Zilla Parishad at the district level and brought extension staff under the umbrella of Panchayat Samithis at the grass root level in Andhra Pradesh.

At the district level, the district Collector has been very actively associated with the Zilla Parishad and is the chairman of all the standing committees. This prestigious position for the district collector in a democratic body has been a matter of great controversy. Added to this, the revenue divisional officer next to the Collector in revenue hierarchy was empowered with supervisory powers over Panchayat Samithis.[14] And from the tahsildars, at the third level of the hierarchy, about 50 per cent of them are deputed as Block Development Officers for a period of two to three years. Thus the regulatory machinery working on parallel lines has 'ill-knit connections' with Panchayati Raj in different capacities.

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[10]It is understood that Government of Andhra Pradesh is contemplating some changes in the role of the village officer, aimed at rationalizing his functions.

[11]ICSSR, *A Survey of Research in Public Administration*, Vol. 2, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1975, p. 9.

[12]Gildayal, U C, Behind Decentralized Democracy, Some Reflections on Administrative Behaviour: *Behavioural Science and Community Development*, NICD, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 130.

[13]*Report of the Andhra Pradesh High Power Committee on Panchayati Raj*, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, p. 5.

[14]The negative supervision exercised by Revenue Divisional Officer is discussed in G Ram Reddy's Panchayati Raj in Andhra Pradesh, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Osmania University, Hyderabad, 1965, pp. 264-65.

It appears that the attitudes and behavioural styles of the revenue functionaries largely continue to be the same in spite of their association with the development departments. Fear as a tool of man-management, superiority complex and excessive consciousness of hierarchy are an integral part of their thinking. The behavioural style and communication techniques may all too often be described as discourteous and objectionable respectively. This is the trend that emerged from the author's observation and analysis.[15] The following typical instances highlight the magnitude of the problem and broadly indicate the 'revenue culture' in rural administration.

One senior revenue officer of the rank of Deputy Collector argued that 'fear is an important tool to manage the people, without it there would be total chaos in the administration and society'.

One Tahsildar who was acting as a Block Development Officer remarked that Panchayat Samithis is a 'fish market' where every Tom, Dick and Harry can come and demand anything. Whereas, he said, in a tahsil office it used to be very quiet and nobody dared to enter the Tahsildar's room without prior permission.

Another Tahsildar who was also acting as a Block Development Officer, took a very serious objection when a Village Development Officer sat in a chair along with him. This problem was later discussed in the District Village Development Officers conference. They, for their part, took a very serious note of the behaviour of the Block Development Officer.

In another instance, when the author visited one of his relations in a village he chanced to be introduced to a Deputy Tahsildar by the Village Officer. The Deputy Tahsildar in order to exhibit his authority started scolding the Village Officer on a minor pretext.

On one occasion a Tahsildar, who himself had worked as a lecturer for some time before he entered the job, did not allow a lecturer to get into his office when the latter went to make some representation. He turned the lecturer away without giving him a hearing and said 'you fellows don't teach in the colleges, instead you go round the offices and do 'pyravees'.

One senior agricultural officer remarked that the revenue personnel behave badly not only with villagers but also with the officers of the other departments.

Drawing inferences on the basis of these instances may sound as sweeping generalizations. Yet they do indicate general attitudes and behavioural style of these functionaries. However, there is ample evidence by way of widespread anti-revenue feeling and frequent complaints against attitude of these officials. This style of functioning obviously alienates the revenue machinery from the rural masses and perpetuates the traditional gap between the administration and society in general.

On the other hand, development personnel under Panchayati Raj are charged with the ultimate responsibility for the social transformation of rural India. This process includes

[15]This paper is based mainly on the observation, personal conversation and experience of the author. There may be subjective bias of the author.

taking science and technology to the doors of the rural peasantry, introducing the process of modernization, educating the people about programmes such as family planning and training them in the democratic processes etc. In short, the nature of their work is essentially qualitative and the object of their work is to introduce change and the methods they have to employ are extension methods.

To create the conditions conducive to rural development, development personnel have to evoke local interest and excite local initiative.[16] It should make people feel that the government stands and works for their welfare. In other words, the distance between the government and the people, which, in this author's view, is a creation of the colonial system, should be narrowed down, if not eliminated. Thus it is the nature of the work more than the value system of the officers which 'inflicts' a different behavioural style on these officials. It is observed that 'the very arrangement of work pre-empts certain patterns of behaviour among the individuals'.[17] Thus gradual emergence of a new 'development culture' in rural bureaucracy can be noticed by any keen observer.

The development personnel charged with this onerous responsibility have necessarily to come into contact with those engaged in regulatory functions as it works on parallel lines in rural areas and has a frail connection with Panchayati Raj. The present arrangement, it is observed, has a propensity to generate complexes, jealousies and tensions. The interaction between these two agencies is of critical importance and requires a thorough analysis. During the author's survey, development personnel went on comparing their lot with that of the revenue officials and felt that the latter were more fortunate than themselves. The following instances narrated by development staff indicate the sensitiveness of the situation.

One Block Development Officer revealed that, once in a village he was asked to vacate his chair in favour of a Revenue Inspector.

An Extension Officer (Co-operation) narrated that he once found himself in a very unpleasant situation when he went to collect a government loan from a village officer, who refused to pay it to him. But to his surprise and shock a Revenue Inspector was able to collect some other government loan without any difficulty from the village officer, at the same time.

An Extension Officer (Agriculture) described a strange incident. He was once explaining to a group of villagers about a new variety of seeds. But when they came to know that a Revenue Inspector was visiting the village, they left in a hurry to see him.*

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[16] *Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, Government of India, 1957, p. 5.

[17] Iswar Dayal, Kuldeep Mathur, M Bhattacharya, *District Administration*, the Macmillan Co. of India Ltd, 1976, p. 17.

**Was this really strange? Could the Extension Officer have lacked skill in putting over his information? Could the people have been waiting for important news from the Revenue Inspector?* (Ed).

A Zilla Parishad Chairman narrated an instance where once a Block Development Officer was posted to a place where he earlier worked as Tahsildar. On his arrival at a particular village, the village officer and others hastened to greet him wearing turbans, and stood with folded hands in his presence. But as soon as they learnt that he was no longer a Tahsildar but 'only' a Block Development Officer they felt so much relieved that they unwound their turbans and one of them had even asked the Block Development Officer for a cigarette.

Although it is extremely difficult to establish the truth of these allegations, they do indicate the underlying feelings and mental complexes of these officers.

These complexes arise mainly for the following reasons. First, the villagers fear revenue personnel and obey them more readily; second, the revenue personnel wield greater influence, though not power, through the village officers; third, the officers at the highest level tend to lend an ear all too readily to revenue personnel; fourth, the nature of their work, unlike the work of development personnel, is uni-dimensional and finally, their promotional avenues seem to offer better opportunities than those of the development staff.

Of all these factors, the influence the regulatory machinery commands in the rural areas calls for an analysis of the causes. Fear of Revenue Department's powers is a major reason for its influence. Probing into the causes[18] for this fear revealed that firstly, land is the most valuable commodity for the rural people and the administrative practices that are in vogue are so unscientific and haphazard that ownership of land is often not properly established.[19]* Secondly, the records are not scientifically maintained and the person who pays the land revenue is assumed to be the owner of the land. Thirdly, discretion to redemarcate boundaries lies with the revenue personnel. Fourthly, ignorance and illiteracy of rural people adds another serious dimension to the problem. Lastly, because of magisterial powers the law and order machinery, another powerful regulatory agency, is subordinated to the revenue machinery. Thus traditionally the revenue department represents the government totally and is known as the symbol of authority.[20]

Another factor that requires analysis is the advantages that revenue personnel enjoy at the higher levels of bureaucracy, where officers often think that the revenue department is more efficient than other departments. Indeed, whenever government undertakes new programmes it usually entrusts them to the revenue personnel. There are several instances where revenue officials have been deputed to control other departments such as Planning, Social Welfare, Tribal Development, Panchayati Raj, Small Farmers Agencies, Municipal Administration etc. This tendency on the part of the government became more evident when it decided to appoint Revenue Divisional Officers as Special Officers of Panchayat Samithis on the expiry of the term of the non-official bodies. Each officer had six to ten

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[18]Transfer of land from father to son is not effected either because of a joint family system or procedural rigmarole. Secondly, most of the sale deeds are drawn up without duly transferring the ownership of land so as to avoid the government registration fee. This is one of the major problems land reforms programme is facing in Andhra Pradesh.

* *For a contrasting view see the article by Dr Umapathy in the January 1980 issue of this Journal* (Ed).

[20]Bhambri writes that is was the District Collector and the Patwari (Village Officer) who *were* The British Raj to the masses. See C P Bhambri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India*, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1971, p. 57.

Samithis to look after and this created peculiar conditions. In one of the districts, an officer had to look after fourteen Panchayat Samithis. The government had to revise its decision when these officers were not able to cope up with the work and had to appoint other district officers to these Samithis. Some of the district officers complained bitterly about the appointment of revenue personnel, who have nothing to do with development, while officers from the development departments were ignored. The development personnel are sore about it because they feel miserably neglected. The inroads that the revenue department makes into the development and welfare sectors have two consequences. One, the revenue personnel carry their 'revenue culture' to these departments; and two, the officials working in these agencies feel frustrated, because they have been deprived of their promotional opportunities.[21]

Expansion of revenue departments is largely due to the generalist administrator belonging to Indian Administrative Service. It is widely felt that these officers have basic loyalty to the revenue department and normally consider it as their parent department. This loyalty is largely due to the present career pattern of Indian Administrative Service officers in the administrative system. Each officer undergoes one year field training programme under the District Collector, as an Assistant Collector. Generally after completion of the training they are posted as Sub-Collectors for a period of two to three years. Then they are promoted as District Revenue Officers in which posts they work for a couple of years and are then posted as District Collectors. Thus about ten formative years (virtually a third of their careers) of these officers working lives is spent in revenue administration.

Thus the revenue personnel supported and encouraged by higher authorities continue to be a symbol of governmental authority and are employing the same old tools for getting their work done. The traditional forces and the rural ethos lends additional strength to these institutions. They continue to believe that effective management, either internal or external, would not be possible without using fear as a tool. Further, superiority complex, excessive consciousness of hierarchy, treating the citizen as a subject continue to be a part of their culture.

When two important segments of administration employ different approaches there is bound to be tension and a dissipation of administrative energy. Whatever little effort the development personnel are putting in to create conditions for development is in this author's view being neutralized, if not negatived, by the regulatory personnel.

Another danger implied in this situation is the tendency on the part of the development personnel to think that revenue techniques yield quicker results than those of extension. It is true that revenue techniques involve less effort while extension techniques consume both time and energy and give very slow results. But there are no short cuts to the social transformation of a traditional society. However the existing situation weakens the

[21]Some of the employees working in development departments said that while they are stuck in the positions where they started, some of the lower division clerks in revenue department rose to the position of Tahsildars and Deputy Collectors (about three to four jumps in the administrative ladder).

conviction of development personnel in their own beliefs and gravitates them to those techniques which are less irksome and which engender greater ego-gratification.

True development demands greater mass participation which is only possible when the gap between the government and the people is reduced. Any technique that reduces the gap should be encouraged and that which widens it should be positively discouraged. Otherwise rural development in India is bound to be slow. As an important step in this direction the conflict between these two administrative sub-cultures should be more thoroughly analyzed and in the light of the findings that emerge an effective strategy should be evolved to overcome the complexities of the present administrative situation.

A Planning and Management System for Extension and Farmer Assistance in Botswana

ALAN KINGSHOTTE*

Introduction

Agricultural Extension is often badly planned and managed. The reason is simply that of all the tasks a Government may undertake it is perhaps the most difficult to run efficiently.

Described is part of the work done in Botswana between 1973 and 1978 to establish a comprehensive system to plan, manage and monitor in an integrated way all agricultural extension and related farmer-assistance schemes, preceded by a brief description of the country and its problems.

Institution of the new system was made possible by and based upon the reorganization of the Ministry which became effective in April 1975. This brought together in one large Department of Agricultural Field Services all Extension and other work directly related to the farmers with the exception of veterinary work and the development of Co-operatives. Illustrations I and II show this.

The main other change was increased delegation to regional agricultural officers and adoption of the agricultural district as the basic planning unit. If the least populated tracts are excluded the schematic picture is of 200 Extension Areas, each with a resident extension agent (agricultural demonstrator (AD) – Certificate holder) and 200-300 farmers, divided into 20 districts each with a district agricultural officer (DAO – Diploma holder) and a supervisor (AS – an experienced and competent Certificate holder) and these divided between 5 regions headed by a regional AO (RAO – Degree holder). Assisting each RAO is a team of subject-matter specialists (SMS) of different grades, in animal production (possibly more than one, in various specialities), land use, farmer training (doubling as Principal of the Region Farmer Training Centre RTC, group development, 4-B (rural youth programmes) and ranch development. The latter are primarily 'Extension Support Staff' assisting DAOs and ADs, but they also have executive functions in running projects such as poultry distribution, issuing subsidized bulls, siting dams, land use mapping etc. in each region under the direction of the RAO but liaising on technical matters with senior SMSs in national HQ.

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The very high staff: farm family (FF) ration is explained by the very scattered population, poor communications and small size of villages. The typical AD covers a village with 200 to 250 FFs plus a further 50 FFs on surrounding settlements (lands and cattle posts) in an area of 250 sq km.[1]

The major limitation in Botswana is climatic. Mean annual rainfall is 4-500 mm/year (marginal for crop production) but it is very variable and unreliable. Cattle are the main wealth and a major policy thrust is to develop group action to solve many problems but not least as a lead-in to group or communal management of the vast tracts of tribal grazing land. The basis for all Extension up to 1974 was – as in many other countries – a Pupil Farmer Scheme (PFS) which concentrated direct help to the most progressive and hence, often, the wealthier. One reason for moving away from the PFS was acceptance of the essential role which group initiatives should play in the future, particularly in managing water supplies and the surrounding grazing – the most pressing problem in Botswana – but in many other areas also. Each AD had commonly worked full-time with 15-25 individual farmers and often been unknown to the majority and this was inappropriate if they were to spend much of their time helping group or community organizations.

THE DATA BASE – FARMER RECORD CARDS

To plan comprehensive extension and farmer-assistance programmes demands reliable basic data. Much was available from agricultural surveys, farm management studies etc. and more was known about members of the PFS but a great deal about each area and district existed, if at all, only in the heads of demonstrators and was not recorded nor available. Many alternatives were considered but it was decided that with a large staff and only some 60,000 farm families it should be possible to record useful information about each FF as the main source of data.

The system adopted is that demonstrators prepare a record card for every farmer in their area on 'Paramount' punched cards which were also clipped as appropriate for easy sorting. The most relevant data was carefully selected for inclusion on the cards after much trial and consultation. The farmer record cards (FRC) are constantly up-dated. Particularly facilitated are 'hand-overs' when demonstrators are transferred and monitoring of changes in farming practice through summarizing the data on FRCs.

Area Maps: Every demonstrator will have a large-scale (1:25,000) photo-map of his area on which he will enter water sources, cultivated areas, cattle crushes, fences, demonstration sites, conservation measures and any other interesting information. Some have these maps now but their production is a slow business. Demonstrators also have conventional maps, to smaller scales, and dot planimeters for area measurement. To boost their previous knowledge of map reading and use they all had additional training in the form of a correspondence course run by Botswana Extension College.

Regions have full sets of aerial photographs and more accurate planimeters etc. while much more data has been accumulated at region and district level as a result of land use and capability planning done in connection with the tribal grazing land policy. Many field section staff were engaged on this in co-operation with others.

[1]The above *is* schematic; the basis for determining Area and District boundaries is affiliation and hence variation is considerable.

PLANNING

The first step was for ADs to prepare a plan for their work each month and then report on achievement.

After testing and consultation a 'Monthly Plan and Report' form was introduced on which demonstrators drafted their planned activities for the following month for discussion and amendment at the monthly management meeting (MMM) with DAO and SMSs. On the same forms they subsequently detailed their activities and the lay-out was such that comparison between what was planned (P) and achieved (A) was easy.

This was a step forward but needed was a much more detailed planning process in which the manifold tasks of agricultural field services would be properly integrated.

In deciding what type of system to introduce priority tended to be given to the following:

Production of a plan which reflected both national priorities and local needs;

decentralization of decision making with the agricultural district (either an administrative district or covering one or more sub-land board areas within an administrative district) as the key unit in planning: region and national plans to be largely based on the district plans;

motivation of staff at all levels – it is impossible to 'teach' motivation or to force people to be motivated but the management system and style is very important;

emphasis on support for and help to the demonstrator as the key man in extension.

MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES (MBO)

Some form of MBO seemed to be the answer. 'In its simplest form MBO provides unity of managerial action in achieving organizational goals. This is done by establishing for each level of management specific objectives that motivate accomplishment of results in the time period specified . . . MBO is a strategy for planning and getting results in a direction that management wishes while meeting the goals and needs of its participants . . . a motivational strategy, since individual commitments and subsequent accomplishments lead to a higher degree of satisfaction . . . the management essential is co-ordinated decentralization.'[2]

In introducing a form of MBO there were a number of constraints:

the level of education of many demonstrators;

the dearth of management skills or experience;

a starting point for MBO is the logical analysis of problems and solutions, in which many staff had little or no training;

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[2] Mali, P *How to Manage by Objectives*, Wiley, 1975.

a number of conflicting strands had developed within the service which affected attitudes to delegation, involvement in decision making and personal accountability:

a. in a hierarchic structure senior staff make decisions, junior staff follow orders;

b. there is a long tradition of participation in Botswana where the 'kgotla' (village meeting) preceded decision by the chief;

c. 'discipline' had become, for many, an unpleasant concept and some had the attitude that they should not be held to account (or be denied increments or promotion) if they performed badly;

d. many were not 'task orientated' – doing their job was what mattered, not the results achieved;

e. many did not think quantitatively – rather, increase production or reduce losses than increase offtake by 10 per cent or reduce losses from pests from 1,000 kg to 250 kg.

With these and other problems in mind certain principles were established:

staff had to be involved in the evolution of the system, feel that they were contributing and be consulted before and after every step;

training of staff at all levels must be a continuing process, starting from an examination of what is meant by management;

the system had to be simple and try to reduce paper work (in which many had little expertise) to a minimum (in spite of being part of the civil service);

meetings to consider plans should not absorb a quite disproportionate amount of staff time – there is always a real risk that they will do so;

in 'selling' the system great stress to be laid on the 'personal accountability' aspect;

care needed to avoid the common mistake of putting all our energies into preparing a plan with meticulous care and then behaving as though the task was done – management, monitoring and evaluation must be given due weight;

reports should be instituted which primarily compare what has been achieved with what was planned;

although many projects must be set in a longer time scale the ideal time-span for each plan should be one year and if plans were to be properly related to financial provisions one should take the financial year even if this is not ideal in other ways (eg crops planted one financial year are harvested usually in the next).

What is evolving is by no means a classic example of MBO but is is believed to be satisfactorily related to the needs and capability of agricultural field services and that growing experience, frequent consultation and a real commitment to making it work will lead to steady improvement.

PREPARATION OF THE ANNUAL PLAN

The following activities go into the preparation of Annual Plans – not listed in order because many activities are concurrent:

Each specialist division/section sets out the aims and objectives in their subject areas (related to the National Development Plan), their activities and activity targets, the help they can give to field section, the inputs (for farmers and for use by field section) they will ensure are available, the support they will give to extension, including material to be drafted for use or quantity production by the information section, the contribution they will make to farmer training (lecture notes, demonstration materials for RTCs), help they can give with staff training, what monitoring they will do and evaluation, and how their resources (particularly staff time) will be allocated.

Demonstrators discuss with their farmers, farmers' committee, village development committee etc. what problems and barriers to progress they think most important and what types of help they think they most need.

At region meetings (RAO, region specialists, DAOs, HQ staff) the help available to district teams and their relevance to local needs and administrative district development plans are explored and clarified.

At district meetings (MMM) the above are explained to and discussed with demonstrators.

Demonstrators prepare pencil drafts of the annual plans for their areas.

At a MMM demonstrators, DAO, supervisor, RAO and visiting region specialists 'brainstorm' the components of area plans (and hence of the district plan). Most areas in a district have many similarities and in effect all demonstrators are helped by all others present to analyze and clarify their ideas; this also results in area plans having many similarities, which makes their management easier. The sequence of the discussion is as in the forms prepared for drafting area plans.

PROBLEMS/BARRIERS TO PROGRESS

are these the real problems?
why are they problems?
are they problems we can do anything about?
are they very important problems?
what are the priorities? etc., etc.

Then possible solutions are considered, are they practicable/acceptable?, what are the alternatives?, what potential problems may they raise?, what preconditions are necessary? etc., etc.

The *Aims* which should be established, quantified where possible – eg to reduce smallstock mortality by 20 per cent or to increase crop production by doubling the number of farmers row-planting.

The *Objectives*, quantifying to what the activities will lead, eg formation of 'x' smallstock dosing groups with 'y' members and 'z' goats and sheep or the sale of a specific number of planters.

The *Activities* which will lead to these objectives being achieved, the demonstrations, courses etc. which demonstrators will run.

The *Inputs* of all types needed, seeds, implements, specialist help, visual aids etc., etc.

Monitoring of activities and how it will be done.

Evaluation of results and how that will be done.

Demonstrators then re-draft their plans, including an assessment of how they will allocate their time in particular among the various activities to see if it is practical, and may again discuss with their farmers' committee. When the DAO approves they prepare three copies.

Specialist officers on region staffs liaise with HQ officers to ensure that both they and DAOs are fully briefed on the demands likely to be made and the support available.

DAOs draft their district plans, on the basis of the area plans they have approved.

Region staff prepare their plans, showing the aims, objectives and targets in their subject areas, the support they can give to district teams, RTCs etc. and how their resources, primarily time, will be allocated – a step best taken at a second region meeting.

RAOs prepare their region plans, largely made up of the district and region specialist plans, modified if necessary in discussions above.

HQ sections and divisions, if they have liaised properly, can begin planning early because they will have a clear idea what is planned for each district; when region plans are available they complete their division plans for discussion with the director.

A national plan for agricultural field services is prepared, summarizing all others.

Financial estimates are prepared.

The above procedure looks complicated but is, in fact, simplified. District and area plans must include the local implementation of national or regional projects; co-ordination with the plans of others is necessary wherever it is profitable, with district and village development committees and other non-formal education agencies, at any stage a senior officer may disapprove because a draft plan conflicts with government policy or is badly thought out, redrafting will be necessary wherever it is clear that a plan is based upon a level of support or inputs which will not be available.

Revision will be necessary if financial estimates are not accepted – but it is felt that this will happen less often (given rational criteria) because the activities for which funds are sought are properly related to aims and objectives which are demonstrably related to the national plan and local needs; also because the plan will be properly monitored, managed and evaluated.

Training of staff is vital but of particular value in preparing staff for planning was training in 'Enterprise Analysis'. This helped in discussion of problems and solutions as well as subsequent steps. Arrow diagramming (a form of critical path analysis) was also useful.

Experience is limited to date but is worth recording, as pointing the way to further improvement. Perhaps the most difficult aspect to get right will be the balance between 'top-down' planning (local implementation of national plans) and 'bottom-up' planning (national support for local plans). Initially emphasis was given to bottom-up because it was a new concept but some then believed that the only function of the department is to service demonstrators and support their plans. Similarly, some DAOs acted as though they had a clerical rather than a managerial function, merely adding the area plans to make a district plan without critical examination.

The commonest faults in the plans were over-ambition and lack of relation between the different parts of any one plan. Often the activities listed were not those which would achieve the priority aims and objectives shown and the support requested – inputs, training courses for farmers, posters, slide sets etc. – not properly related to the more important activities planned. These faults arise from lack of understanding and logical analysis and will need further attention.

Relatively few new ideas or projects have yet resulted from involving demonstrators in planning to this extent but it is early days. Success may in future be gauged by the new initiatives which emerge.

THE ANNUAL PLANNING FORMS – Area and District.

These needed most careful design, testing and re-design. Basic was the recording of planned (P) and achieved (A) in respect of any one activity on the same sheet so that in the annual reports comparison was easy.

Apart from drafting forms, in white, area forms were bound in triplicate and district forms in quadruplicate and colour-coded. Thus, after drafts had been approved the pink copy was given to the DAO as the demonstrator's plan and he retained carbon copies of green and blue; at the end of the plan year he completed the green and blue copies, using carbon, gave the green copy to the DAO as his report and retained the blue one.

There was much argument about the first section of the plan where the six (area) or eight (district) most important problems, aims, objectives and activity targets were to be listed. One school believed the forms should show how the problems had been analyzed, what alternative solutions had been considered and so on, then show why the selected objectives and activities had been selected and how they were interrelated. This was certainly needed in training staff how to plan but to have attempted to incorporate all this in a pre-printed form would have meant producing mammoth documents which might have been very difficult to interpret. It could have meant including the analysis of 20 problems/barriers to progress and for each of these there could be a number of Aims, for each aim a number of objectives and a number of Activities could be related to each objective. In addition any one activity could be related to more than one objective.

It was decided that these steps could more appropriately be taken in the 'brain storming' sessions at district meetings although it would be useful if any officer attached to his plan the logical justification for it. It was also felt that to ask the planners to select the 6 or 8 'most

important' objectives etc. was both a useful discipline and a guide as to what should be monitored most closely.

Most of the plan is devoted to the activities the demonstrator will carry out, the support he will need – of many forms from physical inputs to training courses for his farmers and topics to be covered by 'Ag Inf' – and how he will work with other agencies, groups and the community together with a breakdown of how he will spend his time. On the last page is a summary of information gleaned from farmer record cards useful, *inter alia*, as a means of measuring progress made by his farmers and a start on evaluation.

An important point is that the ordering of data on the district forms follows that on the area forms, making summaries easier, and data from FRCs is in the same order as on the cards.

The forms now used were evolved after much testing, consultation and revision from, it must be admitted, original designs which were quite dreadful in retrospect but they are related also to the management courses which many staff attended and are much better understood than their complicated nature might suggest at first glance. Their introduction is also helped because a majority of staff actively want them to work, because they have been involved in their evolution and see their value.

They are not perfect – and perhaps never will be. Each year should see changes, partly as a result of the introduction of new programmes and projects, partly as the system improves. If there are not changes it will indicate that enthusiasm has waned, perhaps that agricultural field services has lost vitality.

Because of the many different types of work they do it is impossible to prepare forms for specialist Divisions and Sections to prepare their plans. However they are being guided to use the same sequence and terminology.

Further Advantages of Annual Planning

When the annual plan is complete agreement will be sought from Permanent Secretary and Minister that it meets the aims of the Government's overall National Development Plan – which it will do, if properly executed. This and the internal evidence that the plan makes an integrated whole with each element related to others and in many aspects mutually supportive should make it difficult to impose arbitrary cuts in expenditure but there should be a further result. It will be easier to resist the last-minute imposition of perhaps hastily conceived projects which may not fit into the overall plan. These may be very well meant but grossly disruptive.

This does not mean that all flexibility must be lost but the fact that a prolonged drought or a major outbreak of disease may lead to plans being drastically altered does not invalidate the need for planning.

Submission of annual reports on the work of agricultural field services is much simplified but, more important, they are reports of real value with much data quantified and offering a direct comparison with what was planned and what achieved and analysis of the reasons for variation. They are reports which are valuable as management tools.

It is also possible to demonstrate from plans and reports that major activities are monitored and that the results are evaluated in the most important way possible – by measuring the actual changes in farming practices.

Some Dangers in the Annual Planning System

Perhaps the main danger – and one that has happened elsewhere – is that plans and reports become largely fictional. If management is by remote control or over-centralized the demonstrator may well ask, 'What does my boss want me to plan (or report)?', and then write that. This can be prevented if DAOs pay frequent visits to their areas if they really know them and the staff and if they check that what is reported has actually happened (notes have beeen given to DAOs on the procedure they should follow when visiting a demonstrator); if HQ and Region officers likewise pay frequent visits to the districts and check on the ground.

Another risk is that there may be so much paperwork and so many meetings that there will be little time left for real work. This can happen all too easily in any civil service and is compounded by many factors. The easiest way to get information is to send a questionnaire to every demonstrator, or to have each of them collect data for national surveys. Submission of routine returns long after their initial purpose has been served continues because they are never questioned. Co-ordination of efforts and liaison with other agencies usually necessitate meetings although often the only result is that more is learnt of the activities of others with little practical effect. It is necessary to question critically every new return demanded of staff and to review annually every existing return to determine whether it is essential. Every demand on a demonstrator's time (and particularly those from outside the department) must be questioned and some be rejected or modified if they will result in more essential work being neglected. Co-ordination with others should be enthusiastically embraced when it will be profitable, leading to more effective work, but be rejected when it is a mere time-consuming façade. It must always be remembered that the average demonstrator will only have some 150-180 days in a year actually working with the farmers and if he is burdened with many extraneous tasks this could be halved.

A further danger is that staff will think the preparation of an annual plan is the beginning and end of planning. It must be stressed that it is only a start and much implementation planning must follow. To reduce paperwork much of this (and monitoring) must be done at MMMs by DAO and demonstrators working together.

Doubts have also been expressed about the morality of farmer record cards – a semi-secret card index on every rural family. They must be used only as a tool for better extension work and no one outside the department have access to them and there are no signs that they will be misused. One may also suppose that any government which wished to collect data on its people for other purposes could quite easily set up a system which might include data on religious or political beliefs – not included on FRCs.

There is a final risk that with the growth of administrative district development planning the staff of field section may feel that they must serve two masters, the ministry and the administrative district. Agriculture has much to contribute to District Development Plans

and should be involved whenever a new road, water supply, market etc. is considered. It should likewise be constructive in planning and executing a District non-formal education programme while making sure that it has its priorities right. Such a programme could make a really positive contribution to achieving Departmental Aims but it could also become an excessively time-consuming amorphous jelly of good intentions. The only advice is to judge every proposal very critically.

Similar considerations apply to the 'Village Team' concept. Much more must be done to develop this, demonstrator, family welfare educator, village development committee, community development staff etc. working together on common problems where each can help the other. As an example, work on fruit trees or vegetable growing may be most significant in improving child nutrition and correctly involve a number of agencies. However, the first priority in extension is to be technically correct and it could be disastrous if a demonstrator began to advise on treatment of diphtheria, the welfare educator on control of sorghum midge.

At national level there is a rural extension co-ordinating committee concerned with these problems, responsible for co-ordinating the work of all government agencies and liaising with others. This body is aware of the dangers of duplication and overlap; it is developing common planning and reporting procedures, using the experience gained in agriculture.

Implementation Planning

The final step is to improve implementation planning and most interesting work is being done in Botswana on this. The aim is quarterly monitoring of the more important projects to identify difficulties and bottle-necks. The final step is to improve implementation of annual plans, particularly of the most important projects. Very interesting work is being done to develop action plans based on arrow diagramming and quarterly monitoring to identify difficulties and bottle-necks but it is too early to report the details.

Conclusion

The work described was made easier because many were aware of the inefficiency resulting from the lack of planning, co-ordination and support. An approach based on consultation, training, testing and introduction of MBO built on the desire for change and all contributed to developing a better system. It is hoped this note may stimulate fresh thinking elsewhere.


ORGANISATION OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE 1978
Minister
Permanent Secretary
Deputy Permanent Secretary
(Technical)
Establishment Unit
Finance Unit
Staff Training Co-ordination
Agricultural Surveys
Project Preparation
Farm Management Studies
Rural Sociology
Division Of Planning & Statistics
Botswana Agricultural College
Agriculture
Veterinary
Community Development
Department of Agricultural Research
Department of Veterinary Services
Department of Agricultural Field Services
Department of Co-operative Development
Crops
Animal Husbandry
Rangeland
Farming Systems
Animal Disease Control
Investigations & Research
Tsetse Control
Export Meat Inspection
Hides & Skins Improvement
Livestock Advisory Centres
Field Section
(6 Regions
23 Districts)
Extension
Farmer Assistance Schemes
Rural Training Centres
Short Course Centres
4-B (Rural Youth)
Specialist support Division/Sections
Animal Production
Crops Production
Land Use
Agric Information
Inputs
Womens' Programmes
Farmer Training
4-B
Training
Audit
Co-op Extension


ORGANISATION OF AGRICULTURAL FIELD SERVICES
Director of Agricultural Field Services
Integrated Farming Pilot Project
Animal Production Division
Land Use Division
Deputy Director
Crop Production Division
Agricultural Information Section
Commissioner Of Communal Management Associations
(A New Post)
Beef Husbandry
Goats & Sheep
Art'l Insem'n
Marketing
Dairying
Poultry
Pig Husbandry
Fisheries
Dam Building
Range Ecology
Soil Survey
Soil Conserv'n
Cartography
Land Use Plann'g
Horticulture
Seeds Supply
Marketing
Post-Harvest
Publications
Campaigns
Radio
Graphics
Action Research
Demonstrators' Handbook
Shows
Principal A.O. Planning & Management
Agric Officer, Womens' Programmes
Field Section
Agric Officer, Inputs
Senior Technical Officer, Farmer Training
Senior Technical Officer, 4-B (Rural Youth)
Animal Production Officers
Land Use Officers
4-B Supervisors
Regional Agricultural Officers
Rural Training Centres
Short Course Centres
Group Development Officers
Ranch Extension Officers
Supervisors
District Agricultural Officers
Supervisors
Demonstrators

Institution Building in Thailand The Northern Agricultural Development Centre in Chiang Nai Part II

THOMAS E MORGAN*

PART I discussed the evolution of the concept of regional agricultural development centres from its origins in the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. Particular attention was given to the formative years of the Northern Agricultural Development Centre (NADC) in Chiang Mai and the strategy employed by its proponents to enhance the likelihood of the Centre's survival. This strategy emphasized the building of linkages between the NADC and other actors in the North of Thailand which could have an impact on agricultural development. Part I examined the effort of the NADC to build linkages between itself, private business and farmers' groups. Part II will look at similar efforts to forge linkages with governmental actors in the North and will suggest some reasons for the lack of success of the NADC in its role as a facilitator or catalyst of development.

PROMOTING INTER-AGENCY COMMUNICATION

A major part of the NADC effort to promote systems of agriculture consisted of bringing the various agencies concerned with agriculture in the North into contact with one another. This was as much an educational endeavour as it was one geared to achieving specific developmental objectives. The major objective of the NADC was to project the image of itself as an agency ready to provide assistance. This image would be important to the long term success of the Centre because, given its lack of budgetary and administrative controls, the Centre had few means by which to affect the policies and operations of the line departments of the ministry. Even as they were becoming organized in 1974 and 1975 the branches of the NADC began to establish liaisons with many of the other institutional actors in the North.

The Planning Branch, perhaps more than any other branch, was in a particularly vulnerable position. It arrogated to itself the right to be the arbiter of agricultural policy for the entire North even before it had acquired the experience or capacity to bear such a burden. Any attempt by the NADC to dictate policy to agencies in the North under these circumstances could result in an overt rejection of these claims and prove fatal to the long range goals of the Centre. Rather than seek to influence the behaviour of agricultural agencies in the North directly the Planning Branch sought to influence the source of the policy itself. It did this by forging amicable relationships with the Northern Regional Office

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of the NESDB.* Planners at the NADC spoke openly of ultimately becoming the official planning arm of the NESDB for agriculture in the North.[1]

The Research Branch developed slowly from an administrative perspective. This was inevitable since meaningful research results cannot be produced in the short run. While research results were few in its early years, the Research Branch was working to have itself accepted as a major authority on the research needs of the region.

From the beginning of the NADC, the Research Branch sought to lead the discussion of research needs in the North. An important example of this effort was the creation of a monthly seminar on agriculture in 1972. This seminar, set up in conjunction with the Faculty of Agriculture at Chiang Mai University, brought in speakers on various subjects. Memoranda were sent every month to government units and other interested parties throughout the region to announce meetings and to inform them of seminar topics. The NADC did not attempt to produce immediate results from this seminar. It was seen largely as a device to encourage people to think in regional terms and to meet one another.

The officials assigned to the Research Branch were concerned about the duplication of efforts at local research stations, and about the overall orientation of research in the region. Under NADC auspices a comprehensive review of regional research needs was made as a basis for defining future research policy. Moreover, the Centre attempted to establish a number of committees to co-ordinate research in the region. One committee was composed of representatives of the NADC, the Faculty of Agriculture of Chiang Mai University, the chief of the Mae Jo Agricultural Research Station and the Chiang Mai Agricultural Extension Officer. A parallel committee was formed to deal with cereal crops, and a third was planned for research on fruit trees. Though not intended to dictate research needs, the committees would help the participants to develop a common perspective on the needs of the region.[2]

The creation of the Extension Branch as an integral part of the NADC was a response to difficulties in getting an effective combination of research and extension at earlier regional centres. The staff of this branch travelled frequently to provinces in the region to familiarize local agricultural officials with the Centre and to forge personal contacts with them. As with the other branches, a major and ongoing task was to establish the legitimacy of the activity of the Centre in the region.

In the interests of forging working relationships among the government agencies in the North the original plans of the NADC called for the establishment of a 'Rural Development Training Centre'. The Government of New Zealand had offered to underwrite the cost of this centre. According to the plan the centre would be available to all government agencies to train their officials for work in the rural areas of the North. The NADC would perform

*National Economic & Social Development Board

[1] Both the NADC and the Northern Regional Planning Office had the UNDP as a patron. The UNDP assisted in the first regional development plan for the North in 1970. Representatives of the NADC frequently visited the Northern Regional Planning Office; *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, 6 (July 1969): 80; Interviews with NADC officials.

[2] Interviews with NADC officials.

essential housekeeping chores for the Training Centre and might provide instructors, but the curriculum would be determined by those agencies using the centre. The Public Welfare Department of the Ministry of Interior and the Extension Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives were expected to be major partners of the NADC in the training project. Only the Public Welfare Department showed any interest in co-operating. The Extension Department, which had opened a Regional Extension Trading and Supervision Centre in Chiang Mai did not participate in discussions on this project which it saw as a competitor to its own training programme.[3]

Integrated Agricultural Development – A Trial Run

An attempt by the NADC to assist in a project to encourage hill tribes to shift from cultivation of opium poppies to other cash crops will help to illustrate how the NADC was expected to operate. This project involved a number of departments and several foreign donor agencies. These included several representatives from each of the following: the Royal Forestry Department, the Department of Public Welfare, the Tribal Research Centre, and the NADC. United Nations and United States advisers to these agencies participated as well.

It was expected that other governmental agencies would eventually become involved, including the Faculty of Agriculture at Chiang Mai University, the Faculty of Agriculture at Kasetsart University, the Rice Research Station at Sanpatong, the Regional Irrigation Centre in Chiang Mai, and the Thai-Australian Land Development Project. The latter was located in Lampang and operated principally in the provinces of Nan and Prae. The NADC also planned to ask for help from the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines.[4]

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was engaged in a similar project in Chiang Mai in co-operation with the Land Development Department and the Department of Public Welfare. Though similar in purpose this project was not operationally related to the Mae Sa Project of the United Nations. The officials of the NADC reasoned that if the parties involved in these two projects could be brought together a valuable exchange of expertise might result.[5]

The officials at the NADC were aware of the difficulties they would meet and had no illusions about the success of their efforts in promoting co-operation. Nevertheless, they seized on the opportunity which the Mae Sa Project offered them to test their ability to co-ordinate

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[3] The Public Welfare Department was concerned in the North with programmes to assist the various hill tribes, an area in which the NADC had also shown considerable interest. While this contact was potentially of benefit to the Public Welfare Department, what gives it special significance was that it was made despite personal friction between the head of the Public Welfare office in the North and the Director of the NADC. In contrast, while no apparent personal conflict existed between members of the NADC and the Regional Extension Centre, there was a clear clash of institutional interests.

[4] G A Oughton to Dr Krui Punyasingh, Subject: NADC Activities Connected with the Mae Sa Integrated Watershed Project and Forest Land Use Project, NADC Memorandum, 28 January 1975.

[5] Interviews with NADC officials.

disparate administrative agencies. The NADC involvement in this project was seen as a 'dry-run' which would benefit the Centre whatever the actual effect on the project.

A trip was planned to the project area in early 1975 to reconcile the maps used by each party. A preparatory meeting was held at the NADC to decide on the details of the trip and to try to generate some agreement over the critieria to be used in drawing new maps and on the data collected by each participant. Each agency used different methods of data collection and the results differed considerably.

The tension in the meeting was very high – particularly among the heads of each party. Before the meeting the field teams of each agency chatted amicably, but after the meeting began the leaders tended to become argumentative. One of the difficulties seemed to be the perception by the leaders that the discrepancies in their data meant that one or more of them must be using incorrect techniques. Each party dug in its heels and pointed an accusatory finger at the other. The NADC participants were able to restore calm and kept the meeting from degenerating into anarchy.

The NADC was able to retain the goodwill of the participants for several reasons. First, the United Nations advisers to the Centre had worked with the participating agencies before joining the NADC. They were thus on good personal terms with each agency. A USAID official on temporary assignment to the NADC also helped bridge the gap among agencies. Second, all the parties recognized that the NADC was not an official member of the project and so did not stand to benefit from the victory of any individual agency. The NADC also sought to interpret project requirements in terms palatable to everyone, thus lessening the image of a win or lose situation.

The actual field trip was a disaster. The three teams which were to reconcile their maps arrived at the agreed site and were prepared to co-operate. The head of the party from the Land Development Department, who had come from Bangkok for the meeting, forbade his team to show their maps to anyone and ordered them back into the field. Afterwards everyone dispersed.

Several reasons were given for the reluctance of the Land Development Department to co-operate. There was certainly a wariness of becoming a subordinate to another agency. Another explanation laid a good portion of the blame on USAID. It was stated that when contracting with the Land Development Department for its programme there was no stipulation that the department work in conjuction with other agencies. The department allegedly felt that it was being required to perform work in excess of that contracted by USAID.[6]

Whichever reason is correct, and they are not incompatible, the NADC came out of the affair retaining its image as a helpful mediator and co-ordinator. In the final analysis, however, the NADC was unsuccessful in achieving the goals for which it had been created.

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[6] Interviews with NADC officials.

Conclusion

The problems which the NADC encountered in attempting to bring about an integration of agricultural activities are to an extent the result of unique local conditions and personalities. However, when examined from a broader perspective they shed some light on the factors underlying the persistent failure of institution building in developing countries.

The co-ordination of a number of government agencies is analogous to the problem of motivating groups of individuals to pursue goals which will be of benefit to the collectivity. Individual members of a group have a tendency to refrain from committing their resources to the achievement of the collective interests of the group even when the achievement of these interests will be beneficial to the individual.[7]

Frohlich and Oppenheimer have suggested that to induce groups to pursue their collective interests it is necessary for someone (the entrepreneur) to bear the initial costs of supplying incentives for group members to contribute to the common good.[8] In order to obtain a continuing supply of resources the entrepreneur must enter into an exchange relationship with the members of the group. If the initial pump priming of the entrepreneur is successful the resulting pattern of exchange will produce increasing levels of rewards for both the group members and the entrepreneur. If it is unsuccessful – if the incentives to participate do not significantly outweigh the disincentives – the interaction of the group will stagnate.

The NADC, and ultimately the Office of the Undersecretary of State, sought to play the role of the entrepreneur in order to foster agricultural development. Its lack of success in inducing meaningful co-operation from the line agencies is directly traceable to the fact that the incentives which it offered were potential, while the disincentives for line agency co-operation were real and immediate. In fact, the goal of the Office of the Undersecretary – increased control over the line departments – was itself a major disincentive to the voluntary co-operation of these departments. From the standpoint of the individual departments, they would likely gain more immediate benefits by appealing directly to budgetary authorities than by relying on the facilities and services of the NADC. Several officials of the NADC acknowledged that without acquiring substantial control over departmental budgets the Centre would not be able to induce co-operation among the departments.[9]

A major impediment to the creation of a satisfactory exchange relationship between the NADC and the line departments derives from the types of technologies each employs. The technologies available to the NADC severely limit the incentives it is able to offer the line departments. Siffin has distinguished between open and closed technologies.[10] Adopting

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[7] Mancur Olson, Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 2, 34-35.

[8] Norman Frohlich and Joe A Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 68.

[9] Interviews with NADC officials.

[10] William J Siffin, 'The Institution Building Perspective: Properties, Problems and Promise' in D Woods Thomas, *et al*, *Institution Building*, pp. 124 and 137.

this distinction the technologies available to the line departments can best be characterized as closed. That is, within each department the tasks and the procedures for accomplishing these tasks are relatively fixed and well known. The departments thus have clear criteria for determining what is in their interests.

The technologies employed by the NADC, on the other hand, can be characterized as open. The Centre was an experiment. Though its central objective of contributing to agricultural development was clear, a major part of its function was to discover the methods by which to achieve this objective. Therefore, the nature of the benefits which the line departments could expect to derive from the NADC were tentative. The benefits which the NADC could provide, such as the facilitation of contacts among agencies, could affect only a small fraction of the activities of the line departments. The only major concrete benefit the Centre appeared to offer was the use by the departments of the laboratory facilities which it was constructing. This was hardly adequate compensation for the departments to surrender the direction of their policies. The balance of incentives to disincentives was decidedly in favour of preserving departmental autonomy.

A recent examination of the Bicol River Basin Development Programme in the Philippines by Herbert Rubin suggests that the successful integration of the activities of a number of line departments requires incentives to be immediate and of significant quantity. The incentive to the line agencies in the Bicol Programme was increased budgetary allocations. In other words, the rewards offered to the departments were those which these agencies would normally pursue even in the absence of an integrated development programme.[11] The disincentives in the Bicol Programme to agency participation were potential and remote. Departmental autonomy was not directly threatened, and participation did not imply an irrevocable commitment by the departments.

The agencies participating in the Bicol Programme did so essentially on a continuation of the programme depends to a large degree on the amount of resources available to the entrepreneur or directing agency. If, as is often the case, significant funding is provided by an international donor organization, the cessation of this contribution will lead to an attrition of the participants. In the case of the NADC resources were low, since the funds provided by the UNDP and the Thai Government were for the establishment of the Centre itself. There were no resources allocated for integrated programme activities under the direction of the Centre.

The predication of the NADC on a regional rather than a clearly defined functional basis affects the incentives for co-operation which the Centre can provide to line departments. Theories of regionalism, are quite prominent in international circles, and have been espoused by the policy leaders in many third world countries. In these countries, in particular Thailand, regionalism seems to serve a function which is in part the reverse of that for which regional development theory was originally proposed.

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[11]Herbert J Rubin, 'Incentives for Line Agency Participation in Integrated Development Programmes: Reflections on the Bicol River Basin Development Programme', (forthcoming).

According to Viot, 'The creation of regional institutions is a new phenomenon in many European countries, the result of economic, social and technological changes which have necessitated the setting up of new structures.[12] In other words, the increased complexity of the environment required a management mechanism more able to monitor and to control the behaviour of environmental actors.

The growth of interest in regionalism in Thailand is not a response to existing environmental complexity. Rather the interest stems from a desire to induce complexity into a comparatively simple environment through the employment of multi-functional regional agencies. The design of the NADC is not a reaction to specific environmental problems. Instead it is anticipatory and orientated to dealing with any problem which might arise. The necessarily ill-defined end state sought by regional agencies, such as the NADC, makes it difficult for them to develop appropriate and well-understood technologies. Much of their activity, therefore, must be spent on experimenting with technologies, rather than with proven productive or goal-attaining activities.

Given the ill-defined nature of the NADC and the lack of incentives which it can provide for line department co-operation, it is probable that the Centre will stagnate as did its predecessors. The difficulty which has been experienced in efforts at institution building has raised doubts about its applicability in development programmes.[13] These doubts, however, may merely reflect excessively high expectations on the part of proponents of the institution building strategy.

The effort to establish the NADC may not have succeeded in achieving its central objective. Nevertheless, this effort did more to enhance the perception by policy makers of the environmental contingencies and constraints of agricultural development than did the creation of the first two agricultural centres. This suggests that the value of institution building lies not in the productive capacity of the institution itself, or in the ability of the institution to effect a change in the value structure of the administration. Rather the value of institution building may result from the sophistication in policy making and policy implementation generated by the effort itself. Though the NADC may not be able to lead the development of agriculture in the North of Thailand, the attempt to create this institution has heightened the visibility of obstacles to agricultural development throughout the administration and in the private sector as well. The increased awareness of the systematic character of agricultural development is likely to result in greater *ad hoc* co-ordination at lower levels in the administration and in the design of piecemeal agricultural projects with linkages to ongoing programmes.

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[12]P Viot, 'Through Regional Planning Towards Regional Administration' in E Kalk (ed.), *Regional Planning and Regional Government in Europe* (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1971), p. 83.

[13]Marcus D Ingle notes with regard to the institution building strategy that 'Its overall complexity makes it difficult to readily understand and apply in specific situations where a lack of administrative capacity has been identified as a major constraint to successful implementation'. 'Implementing Development Programmes: A State-of-the-Art Review', Report prepared for Office of Rural Development and Development Administration, USAID, January 1979, (*Mimeographed*), p. 33.

Quarterly Notes

UNITED NATIONS – Recent Publications on Public Administration and Finance

Survey of Changes and Trends in Public Administration and Finance for Development, 1975-1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No E.78.II.H.7). In English and Spanish.

The critical role of public administration and finance in planned development is the central theme of this publication. The 91-page *Survey* updates developments reviewed in the Secretariat report to the Third Meeting of Experts on the United Nations programme in Public Administration and Finance.[1] It is heavily empirical in methodology and attempts to reflect the concrete experiences of developing countries in selected subject areas. The wealth of material collected for the Division's profiles on the administrative and finance systems of Member States was also an important source of information, as were the comments of practitioners attending the Fourth Meeting of Experts in 1977.

In its overview of changing demands on public administration and finance, the *Survey* pays particular attention to the increasing role of government in the development process, the political environment of public administration and the international context for co-operation. The influences they exert on national systems, both in terms of pressures for structural and attitudinal reorientation and a redefinition of the style and substance of public administration, are discussed.

With regard to human resources for public services in general, the *Survey* reviews developments in groups of countries with similar personnel systems, particularly as regards personnel management practices. Human resource planning is treated on its own and also in terms of such trends as the expansion of the public services, unemployment problems, the 'brain drain', and the urban-rural imbalance. The role of training and methods for human resource development are given separate and detailed consideration.

Sections of the *Survey* related to changes and trends in finance include such topics as budgeting and planning, tax systems and tax administration, accounting and auditing. The purposes and functions of development banks, their financing patterns and contributions to the growth of small-scale enterprises are some of the subjects covered in the discussions on financial institutions. Trends in public enterprises as a source of plan finance, their technical staffing and their relationship to Governments are given detailed attention in another section.

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[1] *Public Administration and Finance for Development: Review of Progress and Problems in the Context of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade* (United Nations publication, Sales No E.75.II.H.2).

The general reader will find in this *Survey* much valuable information on the concrete experiences of developing countries in the fields covered. For administrators and field experts, such experiences provide useful guidelines against which they can compare their own ideas for making public administration and finance systems and processes more responsive to the needs of development.

The next issue of the *Survey* is planned for 1980 and every fourth year thereafter.

BRITAIN – Third World Planning Review

The publication of a new journal is always a noteworthy event, combining, as it must, faith, hope and charity. In the past these qualities have not been lacking at Liverpool University, where Adshead pioneered, and Abercrombie inspired, a seminal centre of planning. Over the years the publication of the 'Town Planning Review' has stood steadfastly for quality, integrity, and a belief that planning can be a vital factor in the improvement and welfare of the environment.

It was perhaps only to be expected from the same Department that published the 'Town Planning Review' would come the 'Third World Planning Review'. The needs of the world's areas of greatest deprivation have been receiving increasing attention everywhere, and it is more than timely that a journal specializing in their problems should be published. The Editorial announces that the Review will concentrate on problems such as housing, energy, transport and communications, rural development and planning education, along with other aspects. The first number makes a promising start, with contributions from a number of well-known personalities, some with long and sustained experience of developing countries.

Rightly, the opening statement is made by Judith Hart, a politician with a conscience. She is followed by George Franklin, planning adviser to the Overseas Development Administration. He does a signal service in clarifying the scope and tasks of planning in the third world, and outlining the basic priorities and necessary organization.

Professor Rapoport's thoughtful paper would perhaps be more appropriately placed in the 'Town Planning Review', while Professor Gosling's 'Brasilia' gives the clearest and best informed statement about one of the world's most dramatic planning experiments that has yet been undertaken.

A contribution from the third world would well merit study, as Nigeria is in many respects a prototype, and Dr Okpala sets out the dilemma of satellite new towns versus planned expansion of existing towns.

Morris Juppenlatz, with a wealth of experience in the field, puts out the unanswerable case for more urgent attention to be given to the education and training of planners and others associated with the environment. Dr Higdon relates a cautionary tale from his own hard won experience in Ghana. Finally, the book reviews reflect the standard which one has come to expect over many years from the 'Town Planning Review'.

In spite of the sombre world climate at the present time, the 'Third World Planning Review' is a notable achievement, and should be supported by all those interested in tomorrow's world.

(Specially contributed)

Book Reviews

STUDIES IN THE FUTURE OF WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Interfutures; Facing the Future (Mastering the Probable and Managing the Unpredictable), ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT *(OECD), Paris,* 1979; pp. 425; £8.90 or $20.00.

World Economic Development; 1979 and Beyond, HERMAN KAHN; *Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1979 & Morrow Quill, New York* (paperback); pp. 519; $20.00 & $7.95 respectively.

A number of important publications on the future of economic development from a global point of view have appeared in the last few years. Among them are the Meadows Report (Donelle H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth*, a report for the Club of Rome on the predicament of mankind, New York, 1972); the Leontief Report (a United Nations study by Wassily Leontief *et al*, entitled *The Future of the World Economy*, New York, 1977); and the two books published in mid-1979 listed above. In a paper on growth theories and limits-to-growth theories, in *Policy Sciences*, vol. 5 (1974), I commented at length on the Meadows Report; and I have also dealt with the Leontief Report in some other writings. I would concentrate here mainly on the two latest publications.

The Meadows Report presented the most pessimistic picture, forecasting that if the present trend of economic growth (i.e. growth in population and in per capita production and consumption) should continue, then the physical limits to growth would make collapse inevitable 'within the next century, at the latest'. The Meadows Report is based on simplistic and over-aggregative projections, questionable assumptions, and incorrect data. Its major conclusions are incorrect and unacceptable, especially its recommendation to have the developing countries stop their development at the present low levels. Even the Club of Rome has found it necessary to abandon them. However, in future world economic development, steps must be taken to slow down population growth and to expedite the demographic transition and consideration must be given to the availability and the distribution of scarce physical resources.

The Leontief Report and the OECD Report, using better methods and more acceptable data, both come to the conclusion that 'the principal limits to sustained economic growth and accelerated development are political, social and institutional in character rather than physical'. (Leontief Report, pp. 10-11). Both show that no insurmountable physical barriers exist for rapid economic development of the developing countries, at least in the twentieth century. While the Leontief Report, using the input-output analysis, provides

deep insight into the interlocking complexity of the world economy up to the year 2000, the OECD Report goes a step further. It gives analysis in depth of the physical limits to growth. While it reaches the conclusion that 'the economic growth of the countries of the world taken as a whole can continue during the next half-century without encountering long-term physical limits' (OECD Report, p. 61), it emphasizes that mankind is, in all probability, 'going to experience an enormous period of transition' in the next 20 or 25 years, requiring 'constant adaptation of requirements' and constant meeting of various 'social-political challenges' (p. 62). To the OECD study, the long-term problems seem less serious, due to possibilities of adjustment, technological progress, and the availability of resources, than the short and medium terms during which political crises and social upheavals (such as events in Iran) could make adjustments very difficult and painful. Take energy as an example. In the long run, there would be a shift from an oil-based energy supply to an energy supply based on renewable resources; and there would be no serious shortage of supplies, even to support a world of 11 or 12 billion persons. It is the short-term and medium-term energy problems which would be more difficult. Both in the long run and the short run, the prospects for growth and employment in the OECD countries are conditioned by the need and opportunity of structural adjustments.

For the world as a whole, Kahn's book is probably the most optimistic of all future studies in economic development. It follows a historical approach and considers economic development as part of a process of modernization or what he calls 'Industrial Transition', to last about four hundred years, from 1775 to 2175 (or 1800 to 2200). To Kahn, we are only in the mid-point of the transition, and modern development will continue. He treats the world's resources as a process or system for creating and exploiting various kinds of assets and using them in many different ways' (Kahn, p. 70). Take energy as an example, new resources will be found, new technology will be innovated, new ways to extract and use will be employed, new sources of energy will be turned to. 'Resources and pollution are not likely, by themselves, to constitute crucial constraints on continued rapid economic growth. Instead, growth will taper off because of slacking demand, changed values, and changed attitudes. The latter constrict is now called . . . social limits to growth' (Kahn, p. 71). While the Kahn study does not make an indepth study of the resources and the sectoral aspects of development (as done by the OECD report), it devotes much attention to the relations between cultural changes and economic growth and discusses the emerging new emphases and cultural contradictions (Kahn, pp. 113-180).

OECD's *Interfutures* is the final report of its research project on 'The Future Development of Advanced Industrial Societies in Harmony with that of Developing Countries', undertaken by an interdisciplinary and international team headed by Jacques Lesourne, under the direction of a Steering Committee chaired by an expert from Japan and with the help of an Advisory Panel chaired by G. Ruffolo. It is an exercise in prospective analysis. Much more and much better than many future-orientated studies, it serves as a basis for government policies, i.e. to help the OECD Governments in their policy decisions on development matters. It takes into account the possible change in values in the industrial countries, including both changes in social demands (for example, for environment protection, etc.) and changes in preferences (including liberation through increased participation, changes in people's roles in society, etc. and changes in the frames of reference of such organization units as family, communities and nation in which people live). It deals with the future

longer-term economic development of the OECD countries; how it would be affected by such growing problems as market imbalances in certain major commodities (notably oil), inflation, unprecedented balance-of-payments, etc.; how it could be made in harmony with the development of the developing countries; and what would be the nature of the growing interdependence of the world economy and the future evolution of international economic structures and systems in response to it. It also gives some attention to the question of coexistence with the Eastern European countries. The OECD report studies interdependence without losing sight of specific problems. In fact it starts with an indepth analysis of such specific problems as population, food, energy, raw materials, physical environment, and other aspects of the physical resources for growth. From these specific studies, the OECD report reaches the conclusion that there will be no long term physical limits to growth, but there will be difficult short-term and medium term adjustments. In Part III on the advanced industrial countries and in Part IV on the relations between the advanced industrial and the developing countries, one finds some of the most interesting discussions of specific development problems. Its analysis of the upheaval in industrial structure and its future prospects is a masterpiece, which deserves special attention. Attention may also be drawn to the sections dealing with rigidities within OECD countries (pp. 161-185), its discussions of international division of labour in various parts of the report, its studies of the development problems of the developing countries highlighting both the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the Third World (pp. 199-202).

Based on its studies of the specifics, the OECD Report presents its analysis of the general trends, both the past trends and the future prospects. The major trends of the past quarter century (1950-1975), according to the report, include various political changes, an unprecedented economic boom, the narrowing of the per-capita income differences among OECD countries, significant adaptation, rapid state-supported development, growth of welfare state, robustness of the market, and at the same time rise of government price control, active government employment policy, and government intervention in international trade. Using thee trends of both 1950-1975 and 1925-1950 as the starting points, the report discusses possible futures under different scenarios, each based on a different set of assumptions. The most optimistic scenario is a high-growth one (Scenario A), under which the relations among OECD countries are close under a system of collegial management and trade liberalization, with their gaps in productivity narrowed, there is consensus in favour of high growth, without any rapid change in values, and North-South economic exchanges grow significantly. Under this scenario, the per capita GDP at constant 1970 U.S. currency in OECD countries is estimated to increase from $3044 (1975) to $8000 in 2000; that in the developing regions from $290 (1975) to $860, and that for the world from $960 to $2210, with the gap between the OECD countries and the Third World only slightly narrowed, from 1:10.5 (1975) to 1:9.3. In addition to this high-growth scenario, the study also analyzes the cases of moderate growth (Scenarios B), as well as a North-South confrontation scenario (Scenario C) and a protectionist scenario (Scenario D). Scenario B differs from Scenario A in that there will be change in values favouring moderate growth instead of high growth, there will be no catching up of the losses in the productivities in the 1970s of the OECD countries, and there will remain productivity gaps among the OECD countries. Since some of the assumptions underlying Scenario A (especially steady economic growth and increase in productivity, absence of rapid change in values, ability of the OECD economies to make necessary structural adjustments, etc.) may

be difficult to realize, it is important to consider the moderate growth scenarios. The OECD study presents three moderate-growth scenarios. In Scenario B1, the new growth model, there will be rapid changes in values in the OECD countries, and the results would be difficult to quantify. In Scenario B2, the moderate converging growth model, both the growth rates of the OECD countries and the narrowing of the productivity gap among them would proceed but at a slower rate than in Scenario A. It is projected that in 2000 under Scenario B2, the per capita GDP at 1970 price in OECD countries would be $6470; that in the developing countries $790; resulting in a gap of the ratio of 1:8.2. Scenario B3 is a diverging moderate growth model, involving significant productivity gaps among OECD countries, conflicts among social groups, and other disharmonies. While one may hope that this diverging model, as well as a North-South confrontation model and a neo-protectionist model (involving partial abandonment of free trade), could be avoided, one must take into consideration Scenarios B3, C and D, because they too constitute possible futures.

The OECD study is one of the most sophisticated applications of the scenario method to prospective analysis. The global scenarios used 'are not forecasts but attempts to cast light on possible or plausible futures' (p. 75) 'The scenarios are an attempt to indicate the influence the "choices of society" and the choices of international relationships made by the large groups of nations will have on the development of the world economy' (p. 289). They are constructed to help in policymaking in the OECD countries. The OECD Report's discussion of government strategies and policies, especially concerning the management of interdependence, is very stimulating, even if one may not agree with some of its recommendations.

Herman Kahn's *World Economic Development* was originally prepared as a basic document for the 1978 Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce. As indicated earlier, Kahn takes a broad, historical approach, and the general tune of his book appears much more optimistic than other studies. However, an analysis of the quantitative projection of future growth up to 2000 would show that Kahn's figures in a high growth scenario may or may not be higher than Scenario A in OECD Report, depending on how to compare 1970 and 1978 U.S. currency. Kahn estimates that in 2000 the world per capita product would be $4000 in 1978 U.S. currency, as compared with $2210 in 1970 U.S. dollars in the OECD Report.

As to the long-term future, Kahn refuses to accept either the continuous exponential growth scenario nor the collapse scenario as given in Meadows Report. In the former, per capita product of the world would reach $1.5 million (in 1978 U.S. currency) in 2200, with 340 billions of people, based on a 'naïve extrapolation' of exponential growth of population at 2 per cent per year and that of annual production 5 per cent. Kahn suggests that the 'most probable situation' would be one peaking out at 10 billion people, $20,000 per capita income, and $200 trillion gross product (p. 73). Kahn, however, questions the wisdom and correctness of the view that the inequality in the international system should be removed or that the per capita income gap between the poor and the rich countries should be narrowed. The goal of closing the gap 'simply cannot be approached, much less attained, in the next 100 years', according to Kahn (p. 62). What is important to him is the improvement in the absolute level of income of the poor countries. Up to the year 2000, the gap would be widening, and 'the most that realistically could be achieved' would be 'to reduce the *rate* at

which the gap is *widening*' (p. 65). The Middle Income countries are closing the gap with the Rich countries, but the gap between the richest countries and the poorest would remain high. His estimate for 2175 puts the income ratio at '40 to 1 or less – perhaps much less' (p. 67). It should be pointed out, Kahn's reason for the world's growth peaking out is not physical limits, but cultural and social factors which 'are, on the whole, more or less "natural" and probably inevitable' (p. 74). In particular, increased wealth and urbanization due to economic growth (together with government encouraged birth control programmes) would reduce the growth rate of population.

Kahn discusses possible futures under three scenarios: (1) a 'Guarded Optimism World' (World A), a future world as described in last paragraph, a comparatively 'surprise-free' scenario, a basic scenario corresponding 'as closely as possible to the real world of 1978, the starting point of the scenarios': (2) a High Growth World (World B), reflecting greater overall optimism about future economic growth, with the world gross product peaking out at $400 trillion; and (3) a Low Growth World (World C), a pessimistic scenario, with the world gross product peaking out at $125 trillion and with widening income gaps between developed and developing countries. Khan's world scenario is the sum of country scenarios. The most interesting parts of Kahn's book are those dealing with the six economic categories of countries: (a) Very Poor, including Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti and several countries with a total 1978 population of about 0.25 billion peoples, with per capita product in 1978 of $160, which would reach in 2000 *under World A* 0.4 billion people, with per capita product (PCP) under $300 (at 1967 U.S. currency); (b) Coping Poor, including India, Pakistan, Kenya, Sudan and several countries with a total 1978 populations of 1 billion and per capita production about $300 (reaching 1.5 billion population and $561 PCP in 2000); (c) Communist Asia (China etc.) with 1 billion population and $500 PCP in 1978, reaching 1.3 billion population and $1,240 PCP in 2000; (d) Middle Income, including South Africa, Spain and Portugal, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Hong Kong and Singapore, Taiwan (Republic of China) and South Korea, Iran, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and several countries with 1 billion population and $1,000 PCP in 1978, reaching 1.7 billion peoples and $2,309 PCP in 2000; (e) Affluent Communist (USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary), 0.33 billion population and $4,000 PCP in 1978 reaching 0.39 billion and $7,275 PCP in 2000; and (f) Affluent Market-Orientated, including all the rich members of OECD and OPEC countries, 0.67 billion people and $8,000 PCP in 1978, reaching 0.77 people and $13,555 PCP in 2000. The world totals are population 4.25 billion (1978) and 5.98 billion (2000), and PCP $2,000 (1978) and $3,256 (2000). The most important contributions of Kahn's book include his analyses of the trends in individual categories of countries, especially Chapter 6 on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (China), as well as Chapter 5 on the growing pains of the advanced developed countries.

Kahn's discussion of the big overall picture is very stimulating, but highly speculative and controversial. It has gone far beyond economic growth and dealt with cultural and value changes and emerging new emphasis. Sometimes he has gone too far. While I agree with his view that, due to technological innovations and social changes, the human society would eventually become an affluent society, I would question his speculation that mankind

would ultimately reach a 'post-economic society', i.e. a society in which 'overall production might substantially decline as the world's people became satisfied with the existing stock of physical goods. And given the probable high level of automation, the workers required to maintain the stock might be only a small percentage of the world's population' (p. 16). It is true that Kahn did warn us that the world of one or two hundred years from now may not be 'very happy' and may be confronted with many serious problems, but there is no doubt that he anticipates the eventual arrival of a post-economic society. He really does not consider such a future utopia possible or probable. In any case, a world with PCP of $20,000 (or even $40,000) is far from being a post-economic society. By nature human needs are insatiable: as old needs are met, new needs would arise. It is this changing and growing demands which make economic activities necessary and important, and the economic problem of disposal of scarce means will continue indefinitely. Comment may also be made on Kahn's views relating to culture and development. In some ways, cultural change (for example, that discussed in Chapter 3) could be considered 'the main topic of this book' (p. 221). I am rather uneasy about Kahn's treatment of the Chinese Confucian culture and the Indian traditional culture. Kahn presents the view that the new-Confucian culture has helped countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore in their rapid economic development after World War II (p. 119); and 'Indian subcultures have been spectacular failures at modernization; there is no country in the Indian cultural area whose per capita income is much over $300' (p. 119). My inquiry shows that all traditional cultures (both the present-orientated Confucian culture and the past orientated Indian Hindu culture) are not suitable to the forwarding-looking need of modernization. The ability of the peoples in a number of Far Eastern countries to abandon Confucian culture, but to retain certain strong points in their culture (such as hardworking, saving, devotion to common good, and social discipline), has been an important cause of rapid economic growth in the past few decades. Having observed Indian economic development for several decades, I have every reason to believe that India will eventually overcome and give up its traditional culture and move rapidly in the path of modernization. In fact the world economic development problems will remain unresolved until the peoples formerly under the influence of the Confucian culture, those under the Indian culture, and poor countries in other parts of the world all adopt a forward-looking modern culture.

It would be difficult to do justice to the large number of important points presented in the OECD Report and Kahn's book, within the limited space of a review article. I would limit myself to commenting on a few basic points as follows:

(1) Both studies give too much emphasis on national product as the measure for economic development. To Kahn there is a need 'to de-politicize discussions . . . by focusing on the importance of increasing GNP and GNP per capita rather than on worldwide north-south issues or internal income distribution' (p. 489). Although the OECD Report does not go that far, its centre of attention is often on GNP and GNP per capita. While recognizing GNP per capita as the best available quantitative indicator of economic development, I feel it important to highlight that is is a very imperfect indicator and often internationally incomparable. (a) Many GNP statistics contain very high degree of probable errors. Take the case of China and India as examples. Most authoritiees up to mid-1979 use a figure $300 to $500 (500 in Kahn p. 86, and 256 for 1975 at 1970 USA currency which would be far over $300 in 1978 at 1978 US$ in OECD p. 89) for the People's Republic of China, whose official

figure in 1975 was over $300. However, late in 1979 it formally notified UN that its per capita product was $152 at current US$. India's official figure is also low and is rather near China's latest official estimate. Kahn finds it necessary to use a figure of $300 for India, to take into account 'effects of internal prices and of non-market production and transactions' (Kahn p. 83). (b) GNP statistics are, strictly speaking, not internationally comparable. $150 or $200 buys different quantities of goods and services in different countries; and the PCP in one country (especially a communist country) differs from that of another country in contents. Kahn's use of $300 instead of under $200 for India is due to this factor. However, it would be questionable whether one could make an arbitrary change in one country, while using the official figures for most other countries. (c) Furthermore, PCP does not necessarily reflect the degree of national development of a country. Two illustrations may be given. Pakistan's PCP suddenly jumped to a higher level when Bangladesh was separated from it, without any change in its economic development picture. Also, it would be difficult to say that a country with a low PCP in terms of US$ (China or India), but with the capacity to make nuclear weapons and many sophisticated products requiring high degree of precision and technology, is necessarily far backward in modernization than a rich feudalistic oil-producing country with PCP among the highest in the world. In any case, developing countries with large population and size normally have lower PCP. For all these reasons, it would be far better to use the official national income figures, but making clear their limitations, and not making revisions.

(2) If one uses the latest official national income statistics, then one would have to say that in 1978 not far from half the world population (including China, India, and the 'Very Poor' in Kahn's book) had a PCP of under or near $200 at 1978 US$. It then becomes clear that one of the major challenges in the area of development would be to raise significantly the PCP of these peoples. The classification of countries and some of the propositions in both the OECD Report and Kahn's book would have to change.

(3) The use of raising the per capita product as the main objective of economic development is defective. Although in some passages in both the OCED Report and Kahn's book, one could get the impression that they treat this as the exclusive objective of economic development, the fact is that they both go far beyond economic growth, as already indicated. My comment is that they should both go further in linking economic growth with other aspects and objectives of economic development (including equitable distribution of income, full employment, price stability, balance of payments, etc.) and in linking economic development with social, political and administrative development.

(4) All important studies of the future of development recognize the need for a global approach to the problem of development and the necessity to take fully into consideration the global interdependence of nations. In fact, both the OECD Report and Kahn's book have made important contributions to the study of such inter-dependence. The discussion in the OECD Report on the approaches for improving relations between the developed and the developing countries, the emerging common interests of the two groups, and the differing prospectives is most interesting. But the OECD study is, on the whole, a study from the view point of the OECD countries, as its terms of reference require. The Kahn's study, while taking a global view, is more from the view point of the developed countries. They both

have made important analyses of the situation of the middle-income or the 'New Industrial' countries. However, neither of the two has given adequate attention to the almost half of the world population living around $200 or below in 1978 (in 1978 US$). There is still a need to undertake an indepth study of the future of development of China, India and other low-income countries. Not only the future of world economic development, but the future of world stability, will depend heavily on how and if their development problem could be satisfactorily solved. At the same time, the relationship and the interdependence between the communist and the non-communist countries should also be analyzed in greater depth. This is another factor determining the future of world stability.

(5) Both the OECD Report and Kahn's book underestimate the seriousness of income gap between the developed and the developing countries, as well as the possibility and probability of significant narrowing of the gap in 2000. I think that the objective of narrowing the gap to 1:7 in 2000 in Leontief Report is a much more statesman-like and a much better way to achieve world stability, without which neither high growth model nor moderate growth model could be realized.

In conclusion, OCED Report and Kahn's book are both very important additions to the literature on the future of world development. Both must be added to the list of required readings in this field, even by those who may not agree with some of their analyses and conclusions.

CHI-YUEN WU

The Reorganization of British Local Government: old orthodoxies and a political perspective, JOHN DEARLOVE; *Cambridge University Press*, 1979; $14.50.

The central theme of this book is that there are certain standard opinions about local government in this country which, though almost universally accepted, are in fact wrong. These include the view that the system is democratic, rather inefficient, subject to massive central control, and dominated by councillors of declining calibre. The writer goes on to claim that these 'traditional orthodoxies' are a barrier to true understanding because they fail to reveal the concealed ideological positions which lie behind the façade of reorganization. He then claims that past proposals for reorganization have been based on a desire to take power away from the working classes in the interest of the ruling elite, including apparently the Local Government Commission of 1958 to 1966 and Lord Redcliffe-Maud. In his approach to these matters he shows a certain refreshing iconoclasm.

The bogey that he describes – Traditional Orthodoxy – is given more solidity by the device of selecting for quotation those previous writers who support his argument, and ignoring the others, and also by assuming that all local authorities are alike; no distinctions are drawn between Metropolitan authorities in the North of England, pastoral county councils in the South, rural parish councils and London Boroughs. It is as if one description would accurately describe them all.

The selective approach to the facts of history may be seen in his account of the development of the franchise – a process which has to be made to fit into his pattern of the ruling elite

restricting the power of the working class. So 'In nineteenth-century Britain the propertied classes feared the policy implications of one man one vote, and in the twentieth century there have been attempts to push back the democratic clock' (p. 250). These statements may be strictly true, but they give a very false picture if they are not presented in the context of the actual history of the period. There is nothing here, or elsewhere, to indicate that in this period the franchise was in fact steadily extended. In the twentieth century there were many examples of such broadening of the right to vote –

extension of the vote to women
abolition of pauper disqualification from voting
abolition of pauper disqualification from membership
extension of the franchise to include all residents over 21, instead of only rated occupiers and their spouses
abolition of the business premises vote
reducing the voting age from 21 to 18
abolition of aldermen.

To represent this as 'attempts to push back the democratic clock' is to misrepresent history.

The style in which the book is written is odd; the constant use of italics to add emphasis, and occasional exclamation marks to add even more emphasis, remind one of Queen Victoria's letters, when she was particularly indignant. The recurrent description of research of which the author approves as 'decent research' (as distinct from what?) and as being of 'crushing relevance' is more reminiscent of the Bright Young Things of the 1920s. On such a sentence as 'Liberal theory can quite literally be stood on its head!' (p. 49) no comment is needed.

The views of writers of whom Dr Dearlove does not approve are described as 'tired ideology', 'Pseudo-science', 'Bad research and poor theory' and 'Hopeless diagnosis'; such writers 'limply assert' their views, whereas those on his side are commonly described as either decent or crisp; indeed 'the firm entrenchment of this perspective is crisply situated within the prevailing ideology of science and technology'.

Whether readers in the Third World in search of information about the process of reorganization in Britain will get much benefit from reading this book is open to doubt. It is difficult to believe that the author's idiosyncratic view of the history of English local government will give them a clearer vision of the purposes and methods of reform. They may even find themselves as confused as Dr Dearlove professes himself to be about management reorganization.

B. KEITH-LUCAS

Sir Matthew Nathan: British Colonial Governor and Civil Servant, ANTHONY P. HAYDEN, *University of Queensland Press,* 1976. **Robert Delavignette on the French Empire: selected writings,** WILLIAM B. COHEN, ed., *University of Chicago Press,* 1977.

In an ideal world, the study of colonial governors should shed a lot of light on the art (or science, as a later generation would prefer it) of public administration. Here were hundreds

of proconsuls administering territories often many times the area of the metropole and sometimes containing populations in their millions; and often ruling them in a spirit of more personal (in the sense of 'direct') administration and with a lesser bureaucratic edifice than in comparable situations virtually anywhere else in the world. Yet just how 'professional' Britain's imperial civil servants really were is a matter of semantics as well as of pride or prejudice. Technically 'qualified' and 'trained for the job' probably not; ultimately 'experienced' and 'trained on the job' unequivocally yes. By mid-career if not as fledgeling new entry, the Indian Civil Service, the Sudan Political Service and the Colonial Administrative Service did unambiguously constitute an elite corps of professional overseas adminstrators.

Some, of course, were more professional and 'better' (not necessarily a matter of cause and effect) administrators than others. This was even truer at the topmost proconsular level, where the selection of a governor required qualities additional to the basic one – not always correctly identified – of administrative excellence, than at the level of the officers in the field, where almost by definition every one of them had to practise administration in one form or another as his daily bread. Curiously enough, Sir Matthew Nathan was at once among the most qualified of colonial governors in terms of bureaucratic experience (how many other governors can point to fifteen years in Government House, supplemented by the Secretaryship of the Post Office in the Home Civil Service, the Under-Secretaryship of Ireland and the post of First Secretary in the Ministry of Pensions?) and also, as Dr Hayden suggests in his pioneering and revealing study of this unusual colonial governor, a bit of an anachronism, 'one of the last of the breed of amateurs who ran the Empire'.

For all his record of no less than four colonial governorships spaced over a quarter of a century (Gold Coast, Hong Kong, Natal and Queensland, with hopes of an Indian appointment and actually reaching the short-list for Ceylon, the plum of the service, into the bargain), it is Nathan's disastrous eighteen months in Ireland which have hitherto received more attention than any other of his numerous appointments. This brief interlude in forty years of public service was, as Dr Hayden shows, to cast a permanent shadow over any reputation Nathan had or might yet have had as an administrator. In Ireland he encountered every colonial governor's nightmare: a native uprising, namely *les évènements* in Dublin of Easter, 1916, to use the modern euphemism for the turmoil that took place in Paris in May, 1968. Nathan's reaction constituted the conventional nightmare of the Colonial Office, too: falling between the stools of action and inaction, the sort of unacceptable 'official ignorance' which seems to have neutralized Governor Mitchell's response to credible reports of Mau Mau in the last tired months of his too long tenure of office. After his dismissal for having failed to keep the very peace he had been sent to Ireland to ensure, Nathan was rescued from the threat of further disgrace and total obscurity by the offer of a grace-and-favour appointment as Governor of Queensland – one of the breed of 'imported governors' so castigated by Edward Theodore's Labour administration. In retirement, Hayden makes the telling point, unlike his peers and 'professional' fellow-governors Lugard and Clifford, Nathan devoted himself not to writing authoritative treatises on colonial administration or the cultures of the peoples of the Empire, but to immersing himself in English local government and history – High Sheriff of Somerset and the *Annals of West Coker*, the village where he died from angina in April 1939, aged 77.

Why has such a most-appointed governor never been ranked among the most successful governors, like Lugard and Clifford and Cameron in the grand period of colonial administration, Richards and Burns and Mitchell in the late-middle period, or Arden-Clarke, Dorman and Turnbull in the era of the transfer of power? Why has Matthew Nathan's name, in the context of colonial administration, evoked the same sort of response as Carter's is reputed to have elicited in the presidential election of 1976, 'Jimmy *who*?' The answer, of course, reveals as much about the Colonial Office and its criteria for the selection of its governors as it does about public administration in its imperial context overseas. Certainly it was not because Nathan belonged to two of the minority groups of gubernatorial provenance, Jews and Sappers, both of whom have brought lustre to the galaxy of Britain's colonial governors. Membership of one other minority label, bachelorhood, might have militated against him in a final run-off between otherwise equally qualified contestants for a governership. Dr Hayden, from whose Yale thesis this biography stems, offers several explanations of Nathan's failure to stay at the top despite his successive achievements in reaching it: 'promoted beyond his powers', the last of the amateurs of Empire among the up-and-coming professionals, the Irish evidence of his inability to control (surely a major aspect of administration) – in brief, Nathan was short of the gifts to match the gift of high public office. In Hayden's final, astute summary, Nathan's most striking quality as an administrator was his 'caretaker mentality', constrasting unimpressively with the 'proconsular defiance of orders by his predecessors and the zealous pursuit of self-assigned roles as trustees by his professional successors'. Sadly, but simply, Nathan was just not up to being a twentieth century colonial governor.

Of Nathan it could never have been said by his superior officer, as it was of Delavignette (see below): 'This is a first-class official who will always be the right man, be it in the bush or in an office'. His 'caretaker mentality' made him into that not uncommon type of administrator, a good No. 2 without that extra flair required of a good No. 1 – the sort of sound and solid Chief Secretary who did not quite have it in him to be a Governor. Good colonial governors needed to be something more than Nathan's self-objective of 'a good public servant of the state'. Fortunately, though neither subject nor treatment can be said to rise far above the mildly interesting (save to the *aficionado* like this reviewer). Dr Hayden has made a first-class job of a second-class official: Nathan's biography is a far nobler product than his career.

Hayden's interesting study provides a valuable addition to that kind of 'careful monographic biography' of those who either called themselves, or are labelled by others, 'imperialists' which Professor Robin Winks of Yale University (Dr Hayden's mentor, too) calls for in his foreword to the latest volume in his *Studies in Imperialism*. This is William Cohen's short selection (the book is less than 150 pages all told) of Robert Delavignettee's writings on French colonial administration. Delavignette, 'le grand Bob', was not only one of France's outstanding imperial administrators – no Nathan he – , embracing in his career the post of District Officer and High Commissioner, Director of the famous colonial college ENFOM, and the highest permanent officer of the Ministry of Colonies; he was also one of the most articulate, making a name for himself as a writer as well as an administrator. What Professor Cohen (to whom we already owe that excellent and perceptive history of the French Colonial Service in Africa, *Rulers of Empire* (1971) has done is to make a selection from Delavignette's numerous writings on France's colonial administration and, by

skilfully grouping them under such headings as 'The District Officer', 'Training Colonial Administrators', 'Colonial Policy', etc. (regrettably, there is none on 'The Colonial Governor'), present us with the inner workings of the French colonial system through an examination of the thoughts of one of its most experienced and brilliant officials. Two of Delavignette's books are excluded from consideration, on the grounds that they already exist in an English translation: *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa* (1950) and *Christianity and Colonialism* (1964). Credit is rightly given to Camille Garnier for her successful translations of the passages selected from Delavignette's other books, his hundreds of journal and newspaper articles, and occasionally his manuscript papers in the National Archives, Paris.

Besides Dr Cohen's admirable biographical essay on the importance of Delavignette and his work, each section carries its own brief scene-setting introduction, with a cross-reference to the passages that follow and to the actual sources of the excerpts. An index is essential in a work of this nature, and the present one stands up well to the demands made upon it. The same can in no way be said of the bibliography, a worthless item as it now stands. Not only does it unbelievably omit a work of Delavignette's praised by both the Series editor and compiler of the book (his pseudonymous novel *Toum*, published in 1926 under the authorship of Louis Faivre, his own middle name and his mother's maiden name), as well as, believe it or not, any reference to what Cohen himself recognizes as 'the book that created his fame', *Paysans Noirs*, but it pretentiously and unnecessarily cites the German edition of Albertini's book on *Decolonization* and, in a manner unbecoming to the University of Chicago Press, grossly misspells all but one of the names of the author of the leading study of political parties in francophone Africa. Quite apart from these irritating minutiae, one wonders why the editors did not take the trouble to convert the bibliographic part of the book into something really worthwhile and valuable, namely a listing of Delavignette's own works, in which the strength of the book lies? For all the vexation of finding in a work of this superior pedigree – Series editor, author, publisher and theme – the blemish of spoiling a ship for a ha'p'orth of tar, William Cohen's 'monographic biography' of one of France's most successful and distinguished overseas administrators is a sound, sensible and welcome contribution to the specifically French nature of the imperial experience.

A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

Voluntary Agencies and Housing, MADHAV ACHWAL; *Published by UNICEF, New Delhi*, 1979. Rupees 50. Pp. xii+99.

If this slim volume proves nothing else it shows that, in India at any rate, there is no consensus about building low-income housing. This is perhaps not surprising, since India is huge and contains a selection of climate and physical types representative of large parts of the developing world. Nevertheless, the preface clearly recommends an approach to low-income housing which the nine case studies collectively do not endorse. The book is bitty, often contradictory, inconclusive, and rambling despite its shortness.

The heart of the book is a collection of nine short case studies of different attempts in India to provide housing for low-income groups. One of them (Operations Research Group) is

nothing more than a consultants' prospectus, and of no further interest. Another (Siporex India Ltd.) is an uncritical account of what seems, on the evidence provided, to be a largely unsuitable method based on multi-storey prefabricated apartments. There are three appendices, with little in common with each other or the rest of the book.

Thus the interest of the book, and, despite the above remarks, it has some interest to students of housing, lies in the remaining case studies. If they have a common thread, it is the close association of community agencies with the construction of housing and social facilities. However, two cases (Laurie Baker and Krisna Iyer) deal with the work of two individuals without apparent reliance on community efforts (and, incidentally, pulling in precisely opposite directions in their professional results). Thus the title of the book is certainly misleading.

Dr William Cousins' Preface promises much. He makes a number of generalizations. Voluntary organizations have a useful part to play. Single storey housing is preferable for both the urban and rural poor. Self-help and community participation can help to make housing more appropriate, popular and cheap. The residents themselves can make significant contributions of labour, materials and capital towards their housing. Materials should be indigenous, cheap and readily available. The designed life of the building need not be excessive – 20-25 years should be ample. Designs and technology should be appropriate, although there is scope for imagination and innovation.

These are eminently sensible and widely-shared views, yet there is hardly a single one which is not contradicted by one or other of the case studies. One wonders, unkindly, whether Dr Cousins actually read the book that he so admirably launched. The absence of voluntary or community efforts from four of the case studies has already been noted. The desirability of single-storey units is clearly not shared by Siporex Ltd., with their Swedish industrialized methods. Although the Asha Niketan Welfare Centre rejected a number of standardized and prefabricated systems because they 'involved sophisticated technology for production and assembly, use of scarce and costly materials, were unsuitable to the climatic conditions, and did not give much scope for self-help', other cases preferred such systems precisely because they had these qualities (Siporex, Krisna Iyer). Even the Asha Niketan and Baroda schemes entailed the use of prefabricated frames, which have had poor results in other parts of the world.

The most interesting case study is that of Laurie Baker's work in Kerala, which most nearly matches the ideals expressed in Dr Cousins' Preface. Baker has set his face against sophisticated materials and techniques, and employs local materials and craftsmanship wherever possible. He avoids materials that are products of high technology, such as cement, steel, glass, asbestos, cement and galvanized iron sheets. By contrast he prefers locally-available materials like hand-moulded bricks, lime-burnt brick powder blocks, cellular blocks, clay tiles, wood, or round-roofing country tiles. He believes that residents should be given choice over the amount and type of dwelling space they have, and the chance of altering or adding to their house over time. He is critical of the tendency to 'over-design' low-income houses to provide an unnecessary 'safety-margin'. The study contains some excellent practical building advice, illustrated by sketches.

Many of Baker's suggestions are contradicted elsewhere. In addition to points made above, one can refer to the lack of any scope in several schemes (Asha Niketan, Broda, Jabalpur Harijan housing, and Siporex) for residents to alter or extend their dwellings. One of the subjects of a case study (Krisna Iyer) succeeds in contradicting *himself* in successive sentences (in advocating 'use of our vast manpower resources' and 'use of construction techniques which can effect savings in labour', on page 60).

Some readers might find this variety, indeed anarchy, stimulating and join with Plato in thinking that the admittal of one's ignorance is the beginning of knowledge. There are certainly no set formulae here, on the contrary there is evidence of spontaneous solutions emerging in local contexts, as well as one or two efforts to kill off this very spontaneity by imposing prefabricated and industrialized solutions. The heterogneity of the book would be pardonable if one were able to apply two common criteria to judge the various case studies – cost and acceptability.

Not all the cases quote the costs of their prescribed dwellings. Those that do refer to different periods (one to as long ago as 1969) or else refer to expected (planned) rather than realized figures. In several cases cost savings are not accurately specified ('savings of 25 per cent are possible' – but compared to what? This sounds like an advertisement for double glazing!). Surprisingly, there is virtually no account of the response of residents to their different types of dwelling. No scheme can be said to be a 'solution' unless it is popular with its residents, and an unpopular one soon runs into problems of turnover, lack of development, rent arrears, and bad debts.

The photographs and sketches are useful.

J T WINPENNY

Land, Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, D K KOWET; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.* (Nov., 1978) (pp. 239, paperback).

This is a study of the structural relations between the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland) and South Africa. It focuses on the economic and political forces (the latter more extensively covered) which have characterized the labour reserve economy of the Southern African region.

The purpose of the study according to the author 'is to examine how colonial penetration and internal economic and political organization interacted in creating and maintaining a structure where the three countries function as labour reserves for the South African economy'. It is argued that the interaction of colonial and local chieftain factors restricted access to land and subsequently consolidated control in the post-independence period. South Africa accordingly replaced Britain as the 'colonial power'. A constant supply of labour was thereby secured from the BLS countries for the continued dominance of the region by the South African economy.

The book is based on a doctoral study from primary and secondary sources. The evolution of land control through chieftains, politics of decolonization and post- colonial reforms are particularly well documented. However, the crucial economic links and relations which form the basis of the dominance-dependence thesis are less well covered in the post-independence period. Moreover, important differences in internal relations (South Africa/Bantustans) and those which characterize relations between the BLS countries and South Africa tend to become submerged beneath the weight of the central thesis.

While the book is highly compressed with historical detail of the colonial and post-colonial periods it provokes important questions affecting the future of this troubled region.

JAYA APPALRAJU

Rural Employment and Administration in the Third World Development Methods and Alternative Strategies, C. HARVEY, J. JACOBS, G. LAMB and B. SCHAFFER; *Saxon House;* pp. 111.

This study has much in common with the message if not the style of two recent Nuffield publications in this country on social mobility since the introduction of the Welfare State namely that policies and programmes initiated with the objective of benefiting disadvantaged groups in society tend to result in the relative improvement of the condition of the less disadvantaged. The authors of this study which is concerned with the poorest members of the poorest countries similarly prescribe policies which would make job creation for the landless in rural societies the main thrust in development strategy. Such policies would by definition include – indeed cater exclusively for – those people who usually end up by being excluded from most conventional programmes designed to promote rural development.

Some of the problems associated with this radical alternative to conventional strategies in rural development are considered but not in anything like sufficient depth to suggest that it could prove workable in any other than a revolutionary context. The academic detachment of the authors (and their excoriating use of language) is not however calculated to inspire the rural proletariat to man the barricades which is perhaps fortunate for the public image of the ILO which has sponsored publication.

L. W. NORWOOD

Book Notes

Power: The Global Research and Development Budget, COLIN NORMAN; *World Watch Institute, Washington DC, USA;* Figures, Tables, Notes; pp. 56; $(US)2.00.

Despite dwindling reserves of oil and gas, deteriorating biological systems, rising demands for the food an ever-increasing population requires, a vast amount of research and development funds still go on such unproductive tasks as developing even more devastating weapons of war and restyling consumer goods. Colin Norman points this out clearly and very fairly; then admits the difficulty of how best to re-order the priorities. In particular he looks at the extent to which R&D resources are being built up in the developing countries, and finds despite all the rhetoric the industrialized world has done little to help establish the Third World's R&D capacity. Sweden and the Netherlands come in, very rightly, for praise, while Canada's promising initiatives seem likely to be frustrated.

Attention is drawn to Third World proposals that a percentage of aid funds should be earmarked for R&D and Norman emphasizes that developed countries will not be able to ignore indefinitely the claim of Third World States to decide how to spend the monies they receive. He advocates more resources be provided to appropriate technology groups and singles out the British efforts originated by the late Fritz Schumacher for special praise. He concludes 'the world's (R&D) programme now reflects the needs of the Fifties and Sixties. Major changes are needed to make it more relevant to the needs of the Eighties and Nineties'.

Lawyers in Gold Coast Politics – 1900-1945 – from Mensah Sarbah to J B Danquah; BJORN EDSMAN; *ACTA Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, Sweden,* 1979; bibliographies; pp. 263; Kroner 85.

Lawyers have always found politics a tempting field; often sacrificing income for political influence or power; sometimes, where skills are limited, finding greater security in a safe seat than in a struggle to compete at the Bar; sometimes doing a turn in politics, eg as duty in a newly independent country before returning to a lucrative private sector.

It is therefore surprising perhaps that, by and large, lawyers have not taken a very prominent role in Ghanaian politics in the post-independence era. In this book it is the first 45 years of the century that are examined, when lawyers led the opposition to the British Colonial regime.

The author expresses surprise that the British Administration managed to govern (presumably after the Ashanti wars ended) without any major incident up to 1948. But in Ghana, as in much of Africa, the people proved amenable to the rule of law – provided it was a reasonably just law.

Ghana, be it remembered had African judges, magistrates and advocates before the First World War . . . and in due course led the other anglophone states of Africa to independence with one of the best Civil Services on the whole continent.

On the build-up to the independence period, especially during the two decades between the two World Wars, Bjorn Edsman provides a full and well documented study which concludes with a fascinating account of the celebrated Kuju Thompson case.

Crises and Legitimacy, JAMES O. FREEDMAN; *Cambridge University Press,* 1979; bibliography, index; pp. 324; £11.50.

Sub-titled 'The Administrative Process and American Government' this book by the University of Pennsylvania's Professor of Law has been produced while he has been a Visiting Fellow at Cambridge.

'The Sense of Crisis attending the administrative process has, by its persistence, impaired the legitimacy of the federal administrative agencies', he sees this as arising partly from the Americans regard for the

inviolability of the constitution being upset by inevitable administrative non-conformity.

Now he suggests is the time for a new Administrative Procedure Act – a challenge to draftsmen at least, time when in the USA as elsewhere 'the administrative process grows in scope and authority'. He would like to see legitimacy produced by creative forces creating a system (that will meet national requirements).

But is it not responsibility and integrity rather than a law providing legitimacy, what really matters in the administrative process?

Planning the Future of Saudi Arabia, ROBERT D CRANE; *Praeger Publishers.*

Dr Crane a Management Consultant with high level legal qualifications. He has evolved a theory which he dubs NGM (National Goals Management). There are quite a lot of arrogant assumptions in his argument that NGM is, in effect, the panacea for all development problems – this indicates a variety which belies his lively introduction about the cancellation of Philips multi-billion dollar contract early in 1977. His field of study is Saudi Arabia whose Government soon learnt that it could go a-money making just as well as the wealth-seeking contractors who had begun to drain away even Saudi Arabia's great wealth.

The subject is of immense interest, but the language is dense rather than scholarly and its tone rather too sycophantic.

Ethnic and Racial Studies, January 1980, *Routledge & Kegan Paul;* Subscription Rate: £10.50 – Single Copies £3.00.

The January issue of the Quarterly Journal includes an article by Mastpula Sithole on 'Ethnicity and Factionalism' in Zambian politics over the past 22 years.

Mention is made of the horrible assassination in Zambia, in 1975, of Herbert Chitepo, Chairman of Zanu, either at the hands of the Karanga element in the party often at daggers drawn with the Manyika element – or perhaps the Zambians were involved. Attention is drawn to the attempts by Nkomo to negotiate with the Smith Government.

There is mention of Robert Mugabe's call for power to be vested in 'those who had fought' . . . Now he has won power but is sensibly sharing it with others.

Regimes, Movements and Ideologies, MARK N HAGOPIAN; *Longman Group;* name and subject indices; pp. 508; £7.95.

The author has provided a useful primer for students about to read political science. The particular value of such a volume is that it enables the student to obtain a broad grasp of the many and varied '-isms', factually set out, before he begins to study in detail and to formulate, in due perspective one hopes, his own views and ideas.

The German Polity, DAVID P CONRADT; *Longman Group;* Tables, bibliography, index; pp. 235; £5.50 (paperback UK).

The author sets out to introduce the West German Polity to the anglophone student. This he has achieved admirably – concentrating on facts and eschewing such tempting sidelines as neo-Nazism, and successfully providing the historical background in the opening chapters.

Land Form and Landscape in Africa, J M PRITCHARD; *Edward Arnold;* illustrated, glossary, index; pp. 160; £6.95.

Here is an admirable and well illustrated geography text book aimed at secondary school and college students in Africa. There is a wonderful photograph of Oldonyo Lengai Volcano in eruption. Such a well planned book should appeal to a wide audience outside Africa as well as within.

The text is clear. The maps and diagrams excellently drawn.

The Truth of the Matter, GOUGH WHITLAM; *Penguin Books;* index, pp. 191; £1.25.

Gough Whitlam Labour Premier of Australia 1972-1975, whose dismissal from office caused a major constitutional furore and was followed by Malcolm Fraser's big yet unexpected victory at the polls, here puts down his side of the story. Not everyone will agree with him, and although he is of course indulging a measure of special pleading, he speaks from wide political experience and with an understandable reaction to the unexpected manner in which he was removed from high office.

The Australian political events of 1975 will without doubt be the cause of long legal and constitutional debate for very many years to come.

Pollution Prevention Pays, M G ROYSTON; *Pergamon Press*, 1979; illustrated; pp. 200; £10.50 (hardback), £3.70 (paperback).

Vacher's Parliamentary Companion – June 1979. Published quarterly by A S KERSWILL LTD, *Hilary Preston* (EO); pp. 262; Annual sub £5.00, single copies £1.55 – post free in U.K.

This very useful handbook contains the full results of the British 1979 General Election and lists, *inter alia*, the Ministers and Senior Officers of each Ministry.

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